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This is a study that examines the impacts surveillance can have on trust levels in 
society. The main purpose is to attempt to determine whether surveillance negotiates, 
manipulates, replaces or damages trust in others.
The method of discourse analysis is used to uncover four dominant themes in 
surveillance literature -  the Panopticon, the synopticon, security and resistance. Questions 
of trust are posed throughout each section and analyzed by using a single definition of trust. 
The definitions are derived from four different disciplines -  business, sociology, social 
psychology and philosophy -  to create a multidisciplinary and multidimesional perspective 
on trust. This research contributes to the surveillance literature by reinserting the question 
of trust.
Surveillance was found not to build or support trust. Rather it acted to manipulate 
or damage it in each o f the major themes. Overall, surveillance may have some o f the 
effects described in Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, but it has not completely destroyed 
trust in each other.
Introduction
"There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given 
moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual 
wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But 
at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live— did 
live, from habit that became instinct— in the assumption that every sound you made was 
overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized." (Orwell 1962: 3)
George OrwelTs character Winston Smith lived under a totalitarian regime where 
telescreens monitored every move that was made and every word that was said. It was a 
terrifying image of society where one had to be cautious of even facial expressions as 
nervous tics, looks of anxiety or “anything that carried with it the suggestion of 
abnormality, o f having something to hide” would end in charges o f facecrime (Orwell 
1962: 66). Others were also on the lookout for Big Brother, with children turned into 
“eavesdropping little sneak[s]” who would easily denounce their parents to the authorities 
(Orwell 1962: 28). The book, originally published in 1949, was oriented towards the future 
o f 1984, with Orwell’s speculation about how technology would be used. However, the 
technology that is available today is significantly more advanced than that imagined for 
1984. Has the ability of Big Brother leaning over our shoulders in ways far more intrusive 
than watching and listening affected our society? Must we really watch our facial 
expressions in public? Are we turning into spies who report strange actions by others to 
authorities? Is surveillance making us fearful and cautious around others? How has it 
changed our levels o f trust in others?
Trusting relationships are vital to the proper functioning of society. Without them, 
we would be left in a situation where there is a “complete absence of trust [which] would 
prevent [one] from even getting up in the morning” (Luhmann 1979: 4). Trusting relations
built through co presence - “being in the same place with someone else” - have fallen to the 
wayside with modernity because o f the influx of strangers (Lyon 2001: 15). The data 
gathered by surveillance can be used to create forms of identification that become proxies 
“for the kind o f trust that arises from an ongoing relationship o f co present persons” (Lyon 
2001: 16). Thus, “[t]he focused and purposeful attention to personal details that we think of 
as surveillance is a major means of holding together disembodied relationships” (Lyon 
2001: 16). Yet relationships that are distant are not the only type that exists as we are 
constantly put in situations where human contact with strangers is necessary. Though 
surveillance can be used to connect people, it can also cause issues of distrust and feelings 
of insecurity in countless ways.
If the surveillance that has made its presence in all forms of daily life only works to 
damage or destroy trust, how would we be able to get up in the morning? The obvious 
assumption is that trust is still maintained, but the question is whether the technologies of 
surveillance can change trust relations. The main point of this thesis is to examine 
surveillance technology to understand the impact it has on relationships, with a specific 
focus on how it is affecting our levels o f trust in society. Does surveillance negotiate, 
manipulate, replace, build or damage trust in others?
It is understood that the impact of surveillance on trust has received little to no 
discussion in social theories o f surveillance. To examine the effects of surveillance on trust 
four key themes in the surveillance literature have been reviewed in order to achieve a 
better understanding of how surveillance works. Questions of trust were posed throughout 
the review of key themes to open up areas for the analysis. A discipline was then selected
from which a definition of trust was imported into each o f the review sections. These 
definitions were examined and explained in detail. Finally, attempts were made to answer 
questions about trust using the selected definitions. This process helped to generate an 
understanding of how surveillance was impacting on trust. It also demonstrated that trust is 
a multidisciplinary concept.
Examining the effects of surveillance on trust in this way allowed for a 
multidimensional introduction of trust that contributes to the surveillance literature. Each 
key surveillance theme was chosen because of its prominence in the literature and its 
relevance to trust. The disciplines that provided the definitions and understandings of trust 
were business, sociology, social psychology, and philosophy. These specific disciplines 
were selected because they all took into account social aspects of why and how trust is
Methodological Strategy
The purpose of this study, to incorporate trust into the dominant themes of 
surveillance, was accomplished through a process of discourse analysis where “a large 
patterning o f thought” was uncovered (Scott and Marshall 2005: 159). In this case the large 
patterns of thought were the four main themes chosen from the surveillance literature - 
panopticism, synopticism, security and resistance - which can also be thought of as 
dominant discourses in the subject area. These were uncovered through a process of 
literature review. The injection o f concepts o f trust into these discursive themes benefited 
and contributed to them (Shaw and Greenhalgh 2008: 2509). Overall, my strategy is to
rethink surveillance in terms of trust.
One potential limitation to this study is that the multidimensional definition of trust 
does not convey the exact meaning of trust from the discipline which it was borrowed. Not 
all the nuances o f discipline-specific elaborations on trust were imported. However, in 
using definitions from different disciplines I wanted to enhance the surveillance literature 
by asking questions o f it that were not being posed. What is perhaps lost in each instance of 
borrowing from a discipline is gained in the intellectual liveliness of how trust is dealt 
within each theme.
Selecting Social Surveillance Theories and Definitions
Surveillance in this research can be understood as a way to monitor an individual’s 
or group’s behaviour and exchanges in both private and public life through the use of 
technologies that visually monitor, such as video cameras, or the technologies that monitor 
spaces in which people are not physically present, such as dataveillance that collects, 
collates and analyzes personal data (Yar 2006: 142). The numerous types and topics of 
surveillance made choosing theories a difficult task. However, each topic was selected 
based on the standing it had in social theories of surveillance and the relevance that it could 
have on negotiating, manipulating, replacing, building or destroying trust in others. Also, 
since trust is a concept that has been studied in several different disciplines, there were “a 
large number of potential definitions” (Whitty and Joinson 2009: 97). Each discipline 
selected to provide the definition of trust had multiple understandings of trust; however, 
the attributes taken for the definitions included only forms of trust that employed social
understandings. For example, since psychology focuses mainly on individual cognition, 
social psychology is more useful because it takes social settings into consideration when 
analyzing how people make trust decisions.
The conceptual design of the four themes and definitions may be represented in this
way:
Surveillance Themes Trust Definitions
1. Panopticism: The classic 
and the electronic 
Panopticon
Business: Trust is viewed from a 
rational-calculative perspective where “increases in 
trust decrease transaction costs and the converse 
applies” (Wong 2008: 179).
2. Synopticism: The parallels 
of watching and being 
watched; The virtual world 
and reality
Sociology: Trust is the belief “that the results of 
somebody’s action will be appropriate from our 
point o f view” (Misztal 1996: 24).
3. Security: Technology and 
consumerism; the 
privatization of the security 
industry
Social Psychology: Trust is a “generalized 
expectancy held by an individual that the word, 
promise, oral or written statement of another 
individual or group can be relied on” (Rotter 1971 : 
444).
4. Resistance: Large or small 
group and Individual level 
of resistance
Philosophy: Trust “is in essence an attitude of 
positive expectation about other people, a sense that 
they are basically well intentioned and unlikely 
harm us. To trust people is to expect that they will 
act well, that they will take our interests into 
account and will not harm us” (Grovier 1998: 6).
1. Panopticism - Business
The first theory selected, the Panopticon, is the most dominant theme in all social 
surveillance theories. When discussing any type of surveillance, functions of the 
Panopticon are more than likely to be related as it “must be the most discussed and debated
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theoretical concept” (Lyon 2006a: 44). The Panopticon can be basically conceptualized to 
encompass situations where the few watch the many. It is a form of power that can exercise 
control to create docile, productive bodies. This theme has been thoroughly reviewed in 
chapter one, which moves from the classical analysis of Michel Foucault’s work into more 
modem social surveillance theories from David Lyon, Greg Elmer and Oscar Gandy, that 
each feature technological advances. Writing in this way allows for a historical 
understanding of the Panopticon as well as the ability to conceive more recent 
developments o f technology in which functions o f the Panopticon can be applied. After 
reviewing the literature I found that panoptic techniques were mostly used by businesses to 
collect and piece together information from consumers. Thus, the definition that seems to 
best fit the theories is derived from the business discipline, where the function o f tmst in 
transaction costs is viewed as vital to business gains. Works used to understand tmst from 
the perspective o f the business discipline were from Loon Wong, Tamar Frankel and Lyn 
Von Swol.
2. Synopticism - Sociology
Another key theme is synopticism, which is discussed in chapter two. Though not 
discussed as widely as the Panopticon, the synopticon has been used to explain some o f the 
reasons why the Panopticon is so broadly accepted in modem society. The synopticon, or 
the ‘viewer society’, is the Panopticon in reverse as it means the many watching the few. 
Thomas Mathiesen, who originally conceptualized the idea, understands the synopticon 
working with the Panopticon to discipline the body and mind. Interestingly, this theory 
opens up a range o f ideas because the public is given the opportunity to monitor and
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scrutinize those in power. To describe and discuss the impacts of the synopticon on society, 
Mathiesen is discussed along with incorporations from works by Elmer, Hal Niedzviecki 
and Aaron Doyle who discuss the popularity of watching in general. In this theme, the 
conceptualization of trust is taken from sociology. Sociology mainly understands trust as a 
function, so the question becomes whether elements o f the synopticism, such as divulging 
personal information online, provide a base for trust to develop and function. Work from 
Robert Putnam and Charles Tilly were used in an attempt to answer this.
3. Security - Social Psychology
The third theory examined, security, is a common justification for the use o f 
surveillance technology. It has been selected because of its role in potentially creating or 
destroying trust. Security eliminates risks which can provide potential for trust to build 
between individuals. However, at the same time it may also produce feelings o f distrust 
because striving for security can be seen as “an ambivalent project which carries in itself a 
potential for creating its opposite -  a heightened sense of insecurity” (Aas, Gundhus and 
Lomell 2008: 3). In this way, security plays on levels of trust. After September eleventh 
(9/11), security has gained increasing importance in the surveillance literature. Chapter 
three uses works from Daniel Neyland, Didier Bigo, Lyon, Mark Andrejevic and Katja 
Aas, Helene Gunhus and Heidi Lomell. As risk impacts on individuals, I used the 
definition o f trust from social psychology. Social psychology works well in this area 
because it concentrates on social settings that impact individual experiences and their 
overall decision o f whether to trust others or not. To attain a conceptualization o f trust, 
discussions from Julian Rotter, Russell Hardin, Toshio Yamagishi, Janet Chan, and John
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Mirowsky and Catherine Ross are used.
4. Resistance - Philosophy
The fourth and final chapter contains a discussion of resistance. Resistance is a type 
of oppositional force that is used against power or those who exercise power. Surveillance 
can be understood as a form of power, and where power is exercised resistance will always 
be found. Resistance is interesting because it is executed against surveillance on a daily 
basis and performed by random, ordinary people. It can hold obvious issues of trust as 
those who resist or rebel may be motivated by the distrust they feel about those using 
surveillance technology. Also, those who resist may be viewed as untrustworthy, as having 
something to hide, by companies, the government or society. In discussing this theme, 
works from Foucault, Lyon, Majid Yar, Gary Marx, Gary Genosko and John Gilliom were 
used. Trust has been defined using the discipline o f philosophy because it takes the context 
o f the situation into consideration. This is important because the context for those who 
resist differ greatly. Philosophy also looks deeply into reasons for distrust and the effects of 
techniques that are used to guard against these feelings. Philosophical works from Tom 
Bailey, Trudy Grovier, and Onora O ’Neill are discussed in this section.
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Chapter 1 
The Panopticon and Trust 
In his chapter “Panopticism”, Foucault describes how power can be exercised by a 
disciplinary mechanism in two ways. A disciplinary mechanism is used to fix a mass o f 
people as it “arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact 
grouping o f individuals wondering about the country in unpredictable ways; [and] it 
establishes calculated distributions” (Foucault 1977: 219). The first method requires an 
extraordinary evil, such as the fear and panic caused by the plague, for the disciplinary 
mechanism to take effect (Foucault 1977: 199). Foucault demonstrates how documented 
procedures from the seventeenth century demanded the proper functioning of rights and 
laws during this time of disorder and confusion. These orders held strict divisions during 
the plague, with each person assigned a ‘true’ name and ‘true’ body, and allowed the 
“penetration o f regulation into even the smallest details o f everyday life” (Foucault 1977: 
198). Individuals were ordered to stay in their houses, locked up by syndics, where “each 
individual [was to be] fixed in his place. And if he [moved], he [did] so at the risk o f his 
life, contagion or punishment” (Foucault 1977: 198). Power was to be exercised 
“according to a continuous hierarchical figure, in which each individual is constantly 
located, examined and distributed among the living beings, the sick and the dead” 
(Foucault 1977: 197). Ironically, the massive death and destruction caused by the plague 
were met by an order that held the ideas o f a political “utopia o f the perfectly governed 
city” (Foucault 1977: 198). Unfortunately, this model required an exceptional situation to 
mobilize power (Foucault 1977: 205). It does not allow for a regular functioning (Foucault
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1977: 205). However, the second method to exercise power through a disciplinary 
mechanism only required the right type o f architecture. This was in the form of the 
Panopticon, which can “be understood as a generalizable model of functioning; a way of 
defining power relations in terms of the everyday life o f men” and women (Foucault 1977: 
205). This section will explain the classic literature on the Panopticon to describe its 
features and functions. Following it will be a discussion on the electronic Panopticon and 
modem interpretations o f Foucault’s work for an understanding that is relevant to current 
situations of surveillance. This will make the discussion of tmst also relevant to 
contemporary concerns o f surveillance.
Published in 1791, Jeremy Bentham believed his design of the Panopticon prison 
held the promise o f ‘“ the only effective instmment of reformative management’” (Lyon 
1994: 63). Foucault argues that this design can achieve prisoner reformation through its 
ability “to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures 
the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault 1977: 201). The key to reaching this 
principle lies in its mechanism of surveillance. The prison is designed so that each prisoner 
is isolated in a cell that is placed around a central tower (Foucault 1977: 201). The light 
from the back o f the cells ensure each prisoner is visible to the guards who, “through a 
complicated arrangement of lantems and apertures, is rendered opaque” (Whitaker 1999: 
33). The silhouette of the guards reminds prisoners o f a continuous presence that conveys 
to inmates that they may always be watched; however, because of the darkness, prisoners 
are uncertain about who is watching or when they are being watched (Whitaker 1999: 33). 
Thus, the prisoners “are caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the
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bearers” (Foucault 1977: 201). “As the prisoners fear that they may be watched, and fear 
punishment for transgressions, they internalize the rules” become obedient and self 
monitor their behaviours (Whitaker 1999: 33). Foucault states that through this “Bentham 
laid down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable” (Foucault 1977: 
201).
Although this design was not adopted by anyone in Bentham’s time, to Foucault it 
held greater implications than mere prisoner reformation, as he claimed it was “destined to 
spread throughout the social body; its vocation to become a generalized function” 
(Foucault 1977: 207). The Panopticon’s mechanism of observation gave it efficiency and 
the ability to penetrate into behaviour, making it a useful tool to train and discipline in 
institutions other than the prison (Foucault 1977: 204). In fact, Bentham “specified that the 
principle of the Panopticon could and should be extended to various bounded sites of 
human activity, from asylums to the eighteenth-century equivalent of welfare institutions, 
to workplaces, to schools” (Whittaker 1999: 33). Used in the workforce, the Panopticon 
has the ability to “increase aptitudes, speeds, output and therefore profits” while still 
maintaining a moral influence over behaviour of the workers (Foucault 1977: 210). In 
schools, the Panopticon has the ability to fortify students by developing observation skills, 
writing skills and prompt habits all while preparing the children for the workforce 
(Foucault 1977: 211). It fits so adequately in other institutions because the Panopticon is 
not just a piece of architecture, but “the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its 
ideal form [...] it is in fact a figure o f political technology” (Foucault 1977: 205).
The diagram is significant because it perfects the exercise of power for several
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reasons. First, the Panopticon “can reduce the number of those who exercise it [power], 
while increasing the number of those upon whom it is exercised” (Foucault 1977: 206). 
Second, the type of surveillance makes it possible to intervene at any moment because the 
fear of punishment and scrutiny is a “constant pressure [that] acts even before the offences, 
mistakes or crimes have been committed” (Foucault 1977: 206). Third, the Panopticon acts 
directly on the individual giving “ ‘power o f mind over mind’” without any need for 
physical instruments to intervene (Foucault 1977: 206). Fourth, its strength is that “it is 
exercised spontaneously and without noise” (Foucault 1977: 206). The Panopticon rules 
out the need for a single power, such as a king, because it is subtle and can be “exercised 
continuously in the very foundations of society” (Foucault 1977: 208). The role of the 
inspector can be played by anyone who can observe no “matter what animates him [or her]: 
the curiosity of the indiscreet, the malice of a child, the thirst for knowledge of a 
philosopher who wishes to visit [a] museum of human nature, or the perversity o f those 
who take pleasure in spying and punishing” (Foucault 1977: 202). Teachers, for instance, 
can monitor and scrutinize the behaviours o f students. They also have the ability to 
scrutinize parents as well through student behaviours (Foucault 1977: 211). This power 
extends to include concerned neighbours who might be questioned or possibly comment on 
routines implemented by parents (Foucault 1977: 211). Like the inmates in the Panopticon 
prison, parents may become anxious of who is watching and thus begin to self monitor 
their actions and internalize the rules to avoid punishment or unwanted scrutiny. All of 




Increasing the reach of the Panopticon are “all systems of visibility that enable a 
few isolated watchers to scrutinize the behaviour of large groups” (Haggerty and Ericson 
2006; 27). Going beyond types o f architecture are modem technical advances that permit 
surveillance Foucault only hinted at and “Bentham could never even have dreamed” (Lyon 
2006a: 44). It is argued that new “electronic technologies permit the perfection of [the] 
Panopticon, but now through software architectures” (Lyon 2001: 114). Surveillance can 
now come in the form of pen spy cameras and cell phone conversation recorders that can be 
used at anyplace and anytime. They “complete the panoptic project both by bringing more 
behaviours to light, and by rendering the surveillance apparatus more opaque” (Lyon 
2006a: 44). And with technology’s increased use, the mechanism of the Panopticon spread 
beyond simple bounded spaces “where normalizing hierarchical systems were 
concentrated” (Haggerty and Ericson 2006: 29). It has enabled a collection of data that is 
visual, aural and textual which can span across the globe, thus making “discipline no 
longer limited to single buildings and observation no longer limited to line of sight” 
(Gandy 1993: 23). Observation actually becomes continuous and extremely subtle because 
of the development of small surveillance devices. Also, panoptic functions, such as 
information gathering, are enhanced by new technologies as they can be used to attain 
personal, decontextualized data that can be used to exercise power. These relations of 
electronic tools to panopticism are made throughout the surveillance literature because the 
Panopticon is “capable of interpretation in a number o f ways, and o f course draws on the
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major problematics o f modernity” (Lyon 2006b: 4). In the following section, 
interpretations o f the panoptic literature will be examined along with the functions of the 
Panopticon as described by Foucault. The social theories of surveillance from Elmer and 
Gandy will provide these interpretations. Questions o f trust will then be inserted where 
applicable to allow for an analysis by the business literature on trust to see if  the panoptic 
technology is replacing, negotiating, manipulating or destroying trust. How does this type 
of surveillance affect the levels of trust in society between its members, governments and 
organizations?
Modem Panoptic Theories
In Profiling Machines, Elmer discusses how the automation o f power in 
panopticism resembles the illusion of choice on the Internet. He states that a “number o f 
techniques are used to solicit information from users,” such as consumers cards that 
accumulate points through use (Elmer 2004: 38). But he questions whether consumers can 
be conceived as either “conscious or willing ‘participants’” in their own surveillance 
(Elmer 2004: 38). Upon the addition o f rewards and punishments, the automation o f power 
becomes clear. “Shoppers, for example, who decline or merely neglect to sign up for 
bar-coded discount cards end up paying a significantly higher price for an increasing array 
o f products” (Elmer 2004: 38). In this way, “even if  consumers know that information is 
being collected on them” they must chose participation or face the consequences and pay 
higher prices (Elmer 2004: 38). Coercion hangs in the background as with the prisoners 
who chose obedience to avoid punishment in the Panopticon prison. This “incentive to ‘opt
19
in’ refers to the ‘illusion o f voluntariness’” (Elmer 2004: 38). It shows how the technology 
is automating the collection o f data through its ‘choice’ to divulge personal information, 
leaving business arguments o f enticement “somewhat clouded by a coercive definition of 
panoptic surveillance” (Elmer 2004: 38).
In addition, Elmer discusses how Internet browser cookies are another way Website 
owners can automate the collection of a user’s personal information. A cookie is a type of 
surveillance mechanism in which small bits o f information are stored on a web browser’s 
memory and on the user’s hard drive when a website has been accessed and closed (Elmer 
2004: 117). “Cookies essentially provide servers (and their owners) a means o f identifying 
repeat visitors to their Web sites, and in doing so they fundamentally challenge the ability 
of users to remain anonymous on the Net” (Elmer 2004: 118). Supporters of this tool claim 
that cookies share only a small amount o f information between the user and the Web site 
owner; however, when it is linked to other types of data, such as personal information 
divulged by the user, “the relatively small amount of information transmitted by cookies 
[is] greatly enhanced” (Elmer 2004: 119). When Web browsers began offering options to 
warn users about sites requesting cookies, users began realizing their limitations (Elmer 
2004: 122). Those who preferred not to leave a cookie trail on a Website would be 
informed of an error on the page (Elmer 2004: 131). “With the help of a default set on 
‘Accept cookie’ preferences and cookie options that significantly limit, disable, or disrupt 
the convenient flow of relevant online information and services, the release of personal 
online information has now become either an automatic or forced ‘choice’ for PC Web 
users” indicating a type o f coercive panoptic technology (Elmer 2004: 131). In the case of
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cookies, trust may not be an issue because it is automated; there is no choice. Since the 
Internet is such a large part o f our everyday lives, choosing not to use it because of fear of 
the collection of data may make life very inconvenient. Trust is an issue after being coerced 
into opting in. Certainly it is more beneficial to opt in for discount cards, but the 
relationships between those organizations and consumers must be lasting in order for 
consumers to keep purchasing and providing information. Thus a question o f trust can be 
raised about whether online businesses need to maintain trust within this illusion. How can 
they foster trust while their main goal seems to be collecting information?
Besides automating behaviours, another function of the panopticon is its ability to 
do the work of a naturalist where “the animal is replaced by man” (Foucault 1977: 203). 
This is because observation makes possible classification, characterization and 
differentiation, as well as being able to identify, sort and label individuals (Foucault 1977: 
203). Gandy examines a technique called data mining that reflects these functions. “Data 
mining is the process that has as its goal the transformation of raw data into information 
that can be utilized as strategic intelligence within the context of an organization’s 
identifiable goals” (Gandy 2005: 364). With its primary concern being prediction, 
“data-mining efforts are directed towards the identification of behaviour and status 
markers that serve as reliable indicators o f a probable future” (Gandy 2006: 364). Once 
gathered together, the information is sorted into patterns by practices of sorting, classifying 
and differentiating, then it is used to see relationships and trends (Gandy 2006: 368). 
“These patterns may allow distinctions to be made between persons, behaviour and 
outcomes on the basis of relations between the attributes of each” (Gandy 2006: 368).
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Therefore, consumer profiles are built based on behaviour online and offline to be able to 
better predict the individual consumer’s tastes, needs and purchasing habits (Gandy 2006: 
366). Decisions can be quickly made about which advertisements should be directed to 
consumers through categorization methods used to determine possible interests in products 
(Gandy 2006: 366). These efforts at collecting and sorting data have been confirmed 
successful as “users o f customer-profiling systems report dramatic improvements in the 
productivity of their websites” (Gandy 2006: 366).
Though data mining is closely related to the functions of the Panopticon in its 
abilities to sort, label and classify, its success reflects another function that can cause 
damage to the life chances of targeted individuals. One of Gandy’s primary concerns with 
data mining is the way “in which discrimination in information markets reinforces 
disparities in the level and impact of participation in the public sphere” (Gandy 2006: 377). 
Since there are “no guarantees that the information acquired from database vendors or 
consolidators will be accurate” errors in classification or sorting may cause frustration or 
even substantial problems to specific consumers (Gandy 2006: 377). The ability to alter 
life chances through denial o f access based on ‘objective’ observations draws on features 
of the Panopticon. They resemble the use of the Panopticon “to alter behaviour, to train or 
correct individuals”; its potential to be a laboratory of power (Foucault 1977: 203). “The 
traditional challenge for data miners is to determine which customers are more valuable, 
and therefore worth keeping” (Gandy 2006: 364). Companies can alter consumer 
behaviour as they can deny access to consumers who display risky or unruly behaviour. For 
example, to prevent business losses, companies will watch for missed payments or other
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signs o f ‘bad behaviour’ and begin to deny some customers the ability to sign up or 
purchase an item (Gandy 2006; 364). Furthermore, even though problems with databases 
and interpretations of data exist, many corporations have also voluntarily provided 
“government agencies with access to information out of some heightened sense of 
patriotism” (Gandy 2006: 375). Combined with the power o f security agencies to control 
access to freedoms and rights, errors could certainly cause frustration and detrimental 
damage to people viewed as risky based on their consumer profile. Gathering abstracted 
data and labeling it in technical ways exacerbates these problems as “discriminatory acts 
that would be declared illegal if  they relied solely or primarily on the use o f ‘suspect 
categories’ like race gender or national origin” may increase because these “meaningful 
categories have been replaced by coefficients assigned to variables or explanatory factors” 
(Gandy 2006: 378). These new factors are “less likely to attract the heightened scrutiny of 
the courts” (Gandy 2006: 378). Not only does this mean that behaviours can be categorized 
and sorted, but also that they are abstracted from context and thus lose important 
understandings. It enhances control opportunities over certain groups who would 
otherwise be protected.
Helping the functions of the Panopticon, Foucault spoke of disciplines as a type of 
specialized power that could help the movement from “the enclosed disciplines; a sort o f 
social ‘quarantine’ to an indefinitely generalizable mechanism o f ‘panopticism’” (Foucault 
1977: 216). Disciplines, such as psychology and sociology, can accumulate knowledge 
that when linked together and extended make “it possible to bring the effects o f power to 
the most minute and distant elements. It assures an infinitesimal distribution of power
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relations” (Foucault 1977; 216). Observation and investigation through different 
techniques help disciplines accumulate knowledge in both the areas of natural and human 
science that, in turn, generates power (Foucault 1977: 226). Foucault explains the danger 
o f the intermingling of the disciplines: “These techniques merely refer individuals from 
one disciplinary authority to another, and they reproduce, in a concentrated or formalized 
form, the schema of power-knowledge proper to each discipline” (1977: 226-227). The 
disciplines allow “investigation[s] that [are] without limit to a meticulous and ever more 
analytical observation” (Foucault 1977: 227).
Technology aids in the distribution o f information, making it accessible to both 
experts and amateurs. This strengthens not only the power of the disciplines, but the overall 
power and control of people outside o f those disciplines as well. Gandy explains that data 
mining “is a small but rapidly expanding specialty within the field of applied mathematics 
that seeks to derive meaningful intelligence from the analysis o f patterns within the sets of 
data” (2006: 367). Certain sets of skills in descriptive and multivariate levels of statistics 
are required to be able to use the data in various ways (Gandy 2006: 367). However, new 
technologies offer online analytical processing tools to “make it easier for subject area 
specialists who are not familiar with advanced statistical techniques” to use and understand 
the complex data analysis programs (Gandy 2006: 368). Also, the “diffusion of analytical 
capacity has been enabled in part by increases in the diffusion of relatively inexpensive 
computing power to desktop and even to laptop computers” (Gandy 2006: 368). Thus, not 
only has the information become available for other experts in different areas, but it also 
has become easier to access from virtually any location. Furthering the expansion o f this
24
information are new systems “that enable the capture, storage and retrieval o f information 
that have become more efficient, less expensive and less demanding of specialized 
training” (Gandy 2006; 371). This means that people in different disciplines and even 
people with no training at all can retrieve this information and use it to their benefit as well.
The Panopticon and Trust
There are only small gaps where trust can be placed in the theory o f the Panopticon 
as information seems to be automatically collected, without choice. The abstraction of data 
allows categorization processes to take over that also do not require trust. Thus, trust-based 
relations between the information collectors and the watched are limited. However, there 
may be room for trust in the ability to collect personal information by businesses through 
the “illusion of voluntariness”, as Elmer has suggested. This is because in order for 
businesses to routinely collect patterns of behaviours consumers must be continually active 
in their purchasing habits after the initial information has been gathered. Businesses would 
need to maintain good relations with customers so that information can be continually 
collected and processed. In building these kinds of relations customer trust is gained. How 
do online businesses build relations that foster trust? Do they make any attempt to foster 
trust at all? Online businesses have been chosen as a focus because most of the data 
collection processes discussed above refer to electronic processes. Also, online businesses 
have grown exponentially, making the analysis relevant to everyday life.
Trust in the Business Discipline
25
Trust in the business discipline is “often viewed from a rational-calculative” 
perspective (Wong 2008: 179). This means that trust is measured to determine the range of 
benefits, where “increases in trust decrease transaction costs and the converse applies” and, 
as such, trust is able to “mediate and manage risks” (Wong 2008: 179). In most cases, 
trusting seems to bring about the best benefits both to companies and consumers. In 
trusting, it has been found that “ when each of us can relax her guard a little, what 
economists term ‘transaction costs’ - the costs of the everyday business of life, as well as 
the costs of commercial transactions - are reduced” (Putnam 2001: 135). Online, where 
businesses often believe that they are involved in an interaction that is “one o f collecting 
online data first and selling goods, second”, trust allows returning customers, lengthened 
stays on Websites and a more attractive reputation to form trust among other potential 
clients (Wong 2008: 181). It can also be beneficial to businesses as a source o f social 
capital which consists of “networks o f cooperation and mutual trust” that taken together 
can reap tangible economic gains and returns (Putnam 2001: 324).
Facing decreases to trust, or “when we can’t trust our employees or other market 
players, we end up squandering our wealth on surveillance equipment, compliance 
structures, insurance legal services, and enforcement of government regulations” (Putnam 
2001: 325). Businesses that decide it is more beneficial to abuse trust may suffer a loss of 
customers as “the more people have heard or read about the use or potential misuse of 
computerized information about consumers, the more they are concerned about threats to 
privacy” and may not put their trust in the business (Gandy 1993: 230). Further, mistakes 
can cost customers and reputation as well. For instance, when information was lost by a
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government institution, people “felt that personal data held by the government was at risk” 
(Goold 2009: 214). In effect, while unlikely causing generalized distrust, these types of 
losses “may make it harder for certain institutions to operate”, as in the case o f the 
government institution where “fewer and fewer members of the public were willing to 
disclose sensitive, personal information” (Goold 2009: 214). These reasons may make 
business owners more interested in maintaining trusting relations and better motivated to 
find ways to protect that trust. Thus, trust in both an online and offline business is still very 
important. Gathering information or using panoptic techniques to collect information may 
not work without trust because consumers may not continue to purchase items or services, 
provide valuable information or boost reputation that could benefit businesses.
Trust Online: Problems and Issues
There are several problems faced by online businesses in the attempt to gain trust 
from consumers. One problem is that the online business “industry moves so fast that it is 
very seductive to start thinking in the compressed perspective o f ‘Internet tim e’ in which 
things move faster, change quicker, and become outdated almost immediately or blurred” 
(Wong 2008: 179). These varying fluctuations may make it difficult to build a relationship 
with consumers because the “relatively stable aspects of business which would make 
strategies, decisions and plans firmer” are too easily ignored (Wong 2008: 182). 
Consumers may not be so willing to divulge a large amount of information to online 
companies because “companies that profess to be reliable and dependable can appear and 
disappear in an instant, jeopardizing many of their [consumers’] personal and economic
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details” (Wong 2008: 177). This leads to another problem which is that people view the 
Internet as a distrustful environment to begin with. This may be a major issue for 
businesses to overcome because “the greater the uncertainty and risk in a relationship, the 
more important the need to establish trust” (Van Swol 2006: 138). People are aware that 
the “Internet has created boundless opportunities to deceive [where] fake products can now 
be sold more easily and better protected from detection” (Frankel 2006: 104). In addition, 
“media stories about internet fraud fuel people’s anxiety” (Van Swol 2006: 139). It is a 
place where “frauds, on-line scams, hacking and phishing [the act o f sending email that 
claims to be from a legitimate organization to acquire sensitive information] are common 
occurrences and the everyday consumer is increasingly concerned over breaches of privacy 
and security” (Wong 2008: 177). Moreover, the gap between online and offline reality acts 
to inform consumers that “the rules and knowledge that have informed our everyday 
experiences are not seen to apply and as such it [the Internet] is a place o f potentially high 
risk” (Wong 2008: 177). And because “online communication is more impersonal and has 
less richness due to lack of non-verbal cues and other reductions in social information” it 
may be hard to build trust (Van Swol 2006: 136). As Frankel states, it is a place where daily 
email scams “create for me an environment that teaches suspicion and warns me to be on 
my guard” (2006: 103). Thus, maintaining relationships, collecting data and building trust 
online may not be so easily performed because the feelings of risk in consumers may cause 
them to withhold tmst from businesses.
To help build trust online, there are techniques businesses use. Wong suggests five 
methods that businesses can use to gain forms of online trust. These methods involve the
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use o f “community, flow, brand identity, personal experience, and the idea of institutions” 
(Wong 2008: 182). Online Web communities help to develop relationships because they 
incorporate feelings of belonging and membership that “can enable businesses to grow and 
develop when properly harnessed” (Wong 2008: 183). Flow is the level o f involvement 
which concerns a “highly enjoyable state of consciousness that occurs when our perceived 
skills match the perceived challenges we are undertaking [where we can] lose our sense o f 
self and time is distorted” (Wong 2008: 183). This feeling occurs in businesses such as 
eBay where the “users’ involvement with the site increases the amount of time they will 
spend on it, and makes the likelihood of their returning often” (Wong 2008: 184). Brand 
identity can also help deal with relations between consumers and businesses because 
consumers may sometimes “rationally depend on brand names in making their personal 
decisions” to trust (Wong 2008: 184). It can aid in situations o f distrust as well because 
familiarity or trusted brands o f security will “act to minimize the effects o f [potential] 
wrong behavior” and ensure a user that there is less risk in making the online purchase 
(Wong 2008: 185). Personal experience entails the “growth in tolerance towards the 
variability of service [where] for example, the occasional mix up in order or slightly 
delayed delivery” is viewed as acceptable “so long as recompense is made and apology is 
offered” (Wong 2008: 186). Where trust is low in the beginning stages, it can also develop 
through services that reduce uncertainty such as “well formulated and displayed return 
policies” (Wong 2008: 186). However, personal experience forms only “as the trust 
relationship builds through successive and successful interactions [upon which] more 
informal transactions can be comfortably entered into” (Wong 2008: 186). Finally, trust
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can be built by the idea o f institutions, such as law and regulation, where “in the Internet 
context, beliefs that there are legal and regulatory protections for consumers clearly 
influence and effect trust to be built and developed” (Wong 2008; 186).
Genuine Trust or Manipulation?
Even when trust is gained between buyers and sellers, it is not known whether the 
techniques used to generate trust are in the best interests of consumers. And if it is the case 
that trust is developed for the purposes of self-interested business owners who choose to 
abuse trust, this illustrates the manipulation of trust. In his chapter “Rising Opportunities 
and Temptations” Frankel states that self-interested business owners are becoming more 
common partially because of changes in culture that created “lower and weakened counter 
pressures to prevent gains by deceit and abuse of trust” (2006: 88). He argues that this, in 
turn, permitted companies to become more accustomed to “antisocial habits and patterns of 
behaviour” such as greed and envy (Frankel 2006: 88). Morals and values have been 
weakened with this change as well, affecting the ability to resist temptations and the abuse 
o f trust. Morality is a barrier to the abuse o f trust because it helps to “exercise self-control 
over behaviours” (Frankel 2006: 105). People who are moral are more likely to be trusted 
because they can “exercise self-control in the face o f temptation” (Frankel 2006: 107). 
However, morality has weakened because its foundations have weakened as well. There 
have been decreased feelings o f empathy, guilt and shame. Technology and surveillance 
limits these feelings because of their power to take the context out of situations and 
transform people into numbers. Converting people into numbers changes perspectives and
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makes it difficult “to empathize with each of them [employees, consumers and other 
shareholders] or even empathize with them as a group [because] generally numbers don’t 
raise feelings o f empathy” (Frankel 2006; 111). Also, the growing use of technical terms 
with surveillance creates labels for systems or people which erase o f feelings o f shame or 
guilt. For example, “words like ‘downsizing an enterprise’ blur the reality o f anxious and 
suffering people who lose their livelihoods” (Frankel 2006: 111). Thus, how surveillance 
changes language and images in panoptic ways can lower feelings o f empathy, guilt or 
shame “in people who naturally possess it” (Frankel 2006: 111). Overall, Frankel’s outlook 
gives the impression that where techniques o f panopticism are used - in the form of data 
mining which provides different meanings to labels and a perspective of numbers - trust 
seems to be manipulated to achieve the personal goals of business owners. Consumer 
interests are seemingly insignificant. However, there are other forms of information online 
that can help make true business interests transparent, such as the Website for the Better 
Business Bureau, which “exist[s] so consumers and businesses alike have an unbiased 
source to guide them on matters of trust” (Better Business Bureau). Transparency can force 
businesses to behave in trusting ways so as to maintain customer relations, and can be used 
to demonstrate how surveillance can work to bring forth greater tmst.
Transparency and Tmst
Since the profiles of users, including their “preferences and interests” in dealing 
with online businesses “are formed progressively as they use services”, tmst must be 
maintained between businesses and consumers (Kumpost and Matyas 2009: 1). The
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Internet provides a base of information about businesses which consumers can use to make 
decisions about whether to trust a company or not. As on eBay, transparency can allow 
buyers to “establish a calculated form of trust and choose among sellers based on their 
reputations”; consumers may also choose to find information about businesses to calculate 
trust and potential risk (Van Swol 2006; 137). Examining the relationships on eBay, which 
uses individual-to-individual transactions, can provide a good example to see what the 
differences can mean between trustful and distrustful online business relations.
eBay is an auction Website designed in a way so that ordinary people can buy and 
sell items at their own discretion. It is a market that lacks strict regulations where 
“individuals [are able to] experience more risk and certainty” (Van Swol 2006: 139). To 
help reduce these experiences, eBay set up four controls as a form of security to make 
trading ‘safe’ on the site (Robinson 2006: 133). These safety features include the Feedback 
Forum, free fraud insurance for up to $200 worth o f goods, a Safe Harbor staff that protects 
the site from abuse, and an escrow service that acts as a third party to protect buyers and 
sellers (Robinson 2006: 133). However, “the most popular and effective o f these latter 
solutions is eBay’s Feedback Forum system” which is a “public rating system in which 
people post back their complaints and compliments for all others to view” (Van Swol 2006: 
139, 140). These ratings are left by “the highest bidder and the seller [who have] up to 
ninety days to leave one another feedback as positive, negative, or neutral and to leave an 
accompanying message o f up to eighty characters” (Van Swol 2006: 140). These feedback 
forums are available for all interested buyers and sellers to read thus helping “foster trust 
between buyers and sellers by reducing the uncertainty of interacting with an anonymous
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Stranger over the internet” (Van Swol 2006; 140). It also helps to “discourage fraud by 
allowing people to spread the word about fraudulent behaviour” (Van Swol 2006: 140). It 
is a type o f surveillance that “grants members strong power to monitor and sanction one 
another” by either deterring or leading people to buy or sell items (Van Swol 2006: 141).
Resembling the temptation faced by business owners, there may be temptation to 
abuse the trust on eBay as anonymity allows a person “not to feel obligated to maintain a 
relationship or interact with that person [the seller for example]”; however, the 
transparency o f reputation provides a clear sign o f dishonest acts (Van Swol 2006: 142). 
Negative feedback has a “more detrimental [effect] on the price a seller could command for 
more expensive items than for lower-priced items” (Van Swol 2006: 146). It also hurts 
selling because the enormous amount of members on eBay makes it “easy to find alternate 
trading partners if  one person proves untmstwoithy” (Van Swol 2006: 149). Those who 
maintain positive reputations can reap tangible benefits as research suggests that a seller’s 
“positive reputation increases the final bid amount” (Van Swol 2006: 142). Also, research 
has found that sellers with positive reputations had “buyers who were willing to pay more” 
(Van Swol 2006: 146). This transparency grants members the power to monitor and make 
decisions to trust based on calculation. What is important in this case is that “establishing 
trust is a necessary condition for both online individual-to-individual transactions and 
business-to-consumer transactions” to ensure that people feel safe in continuing to enter 
into virtual business transactions (Van Swol 2006: 147). Thus, trust is necessary to 
consistently collect information, and it can be built online via trust techniques, positive 
experiences and transparency. Whether it is being manipulated or not, trust helps put the
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panopticon into action.
The Panopticon, Business and Trust
The illusion of voluntariness as described by Elmer permits the opting in o f users 
by eliminating the choice that consumers feel they have. This allows online businesses to 
gather information about consumers and apply panoptic techniques, such as using the 
information to determine which users to keep and which to exclude. However, a company 
must be able to maintain relations with consumers in order to continue to exercise power 
and attain flows o f valuable information. Trust can be gained by using online trust building 
techniques that ensure consumers have positive experiences and maintaining a good 
reputation for consumers to see. The transparency and rewards of having good trust 
relations with consumers may be a deterrent from the abuse of trust for some business 
owners. Still, the illusion o f voluntariness might also entail an illusion of trustworthy 
businesses because some business owners are caught up in their own goals and personal 
interests. In this case trust can be understood as being manipulated through the various 
techniques, experiences and reputations used to build trust. Most of the business literature 
seems to suggest this abuse of trust as even Wong states that businesses “invariably [are 
able to] manage their customers and socialize them into acceptable institutional 
arrangements” after gaining trust (2008; 188). If this is actually the case then consumers 
should be wary about how much information they divulge after opting in to any company. 




The Synopticon and Trust 
When the panoptic prison principles are actually put into play, such as in the 
development of Kingston Penitentiary, the results have been controversial “both for its 
treatment o f prisoners and for their responses” (Lyon 2006b: 5). What actually occurs is 
“some seemingly curious reversals of panoptic principles in behaviours” (Lyon 2006b: 5). 
Prisoner’s behaviours go from “self-mutilation - one deliberately and repeatedly hits his 
hands on a stone wall in an exercise yard, causing laceration and bleeding” to “faeces 
throwing and smearing” (Lyon 2006b: 5). These are acts of extreme resistance diagnosed 
as “behaviourally disturbed” (Lyon 2006b: 5). Rather than producing docile bodies, these 
acts demonstrate the subversion o f “not merely the immediate situation, but also, by 
extension, the basic seeing/being seen dissociation that the panopticon is intended to 
sustain” (Lyon 2006b: 6). Lyon explains that this phenomenon represents “the sharp end of 
the panoptical spectrum”; what he views as the softer version of the Panopticon can be seen 
through areas of consumption and entertainment where “[t]he apparently least-panoptic 
forms of surveillance are ones in which a paradoxical docility is achieved in the name of 
freely chosen self-expression” (Lyon 2006b: 6). Here, Lyon is making reference to a 
change o f attitudes in being watched at which point “[tjhere is a reward for displaying your 
body and its activities” (2006b: 7) This typically entails the use of the mass media, a source 
o f entertainment which demonstrates that “it is gratifying to be watched” and is a form of 
spectacle (Lyon 2006b: 7, Mathiesen 1997: 222). Mathiesen demonstrates the significance 
o f the spectacle in his article “The Viewer Society” as a form of power that works
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alongside the Panopticon to help discipline the soul of its participants (Mathiesen 1997: 
218). Mathiesen’s article demonstrates that without the ability of the synopticon the 
behaviours of extreme resistance produced by the Panopticon may have been the only 
results.
Synopticism is “composed of the Greek word syn which stands for ‘together’ or ‘at 
the same tim e’, and opticon, which, again [like in the Panopticon], has to do with the 
visual” (Mathiesen 1997: 219). It is conceptualized to mean the many watching the few, 
and can be seen in all forms of media. Mathiesen was greatly puzzled as to why Foucault 
omitted a discussion of mass media in the analysis of panopticism because the “major 
media trends were certainly visible” during Foucault’s investigation (1997: 221). The 
analysis and inclusion of mass media in Foucault’s work “would necessarily in a basic way 
have changed his whole image of society as surveillance goes” (Mathiesen 1997: 219). 
Whereas Foucault argues that the spectacle was overthrown by the Panopticon as the new 
model o f power, Mathiesen argues that both structures of watching (synopticism) and 
surveillance (panopticism) have grown synonymously in three parallel ways to “serve 
decisive control functions in modem society” (Mathiesen 1997: 219).
The first parallel is “the acceleration which synopticism as well as panopticism has 
shown in modem times, that is, during the period 1800-2000”; they have grown together 
and relatively at the same rate (Mathiesen 1997: 219). To illustrate how these stmctures 
have developed together, Mathiesen describes how the modem prison developed between 
1750 and 1830, at the precise time that the mass press appeared (1997: 220). Over time, 
other systems developed that allowed both stmctures to follow, such as the television upon
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which “hundreds of millions of people could see the few on stage” and CCTV surveillance 
cameras upon which a few could view the many (Mathiesen 1997: 221). That both “the 
panoptical surveillance structure and the media structure are parallel in that they are 
archaic, or ‘ancient’, as means or potential means of power” is the second parallel 
(Mathiesen 1997: 222). An example given by Mathiesen o f a type of panoptic gaze was the 
system used by the Romans to enforce taxation. The Roman State “undertook such a large 
task as to tax, and thereby register, what was at the time ‘all the world’ in the archives o f 
the state” (Mathiesen 1997: 222). Although this registration process failed, at the same 
time synopticism was being used by hierarchical leaders to leave visual and verbal 
impressions on masses o f people. Foucault misses this main point “that the model of both 
systems go way back far beyond the 1700s, and that they have historical roots in central 
social and political institutions” (Mathiesen 1997: 222). Finally, the third parallel, and 
most important, is that “panopticism and synopticism have developed in intimate 
interaction, even fusion with each other” (Mathiesen 1997: 223). To demonstrate, 
Mathiesen illustrates how the military uses panoptic techniques as it “has always had a 
strict disciplinary hierarchy for providing possibilities for hidden surveillance from upper 
echelons of the system” (1997: 223). But it also uses synopticism as well in that military 
victories are highly visible (Mathiesen 1997: 223).
When both structures of panopticism and synopticism are combined together, a 
very strong model for power and control is brought forth. Mathiesen explains that “a vast 
amount o f research shows that they [panoptical prisons] have only a marginal effect, in 
terms of controlled behaviour”, as also illustrated by Lyon (Mathiesen 1997: 229). Hidden
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apparatuses permit society’s members to be aware of the constant gaze o f surveillance; 
however, as Mathiesen states, “we remain, in our attitude, communists, left-oriented, or 
what have you, but adjust in terms of behaviour” (Mathiesen 1997: 229). People will still 
learn ways to be cautious or secretive to avoid observation or scrutiny. Synopticism, on the 
other hand, “through the modem mass media in general and television in particular, directs 
and controls the consciousness’" (Mathiesen 1997: 230). It is able to successfully relate 
viewers to a paradigm, or understanding, o f the world “because it is received in the context 
of a need - satisfies a need - for escape from the concrete misery of the world” (Mathiesen 
1997:230).
Taken together, both panoptic and synoptic structures silence citizens from raising 
critical questions of life and existence through its constant influence (Mathiesen 1997:
230). Sur\'eillance “makes us silent about that which breaks fundamentally with the 
taken-for-granted because we are made afraid to break with it. Modem television, 
synopticon, makes us silent because we do not have anything to talk about that might 
initiate the break” (Mathiesen 1997: 230-231). Its convergence also works cyclically in 
that the more surveillance tapes are shown on the news, the more CCTV cameras are called 
for by its viewers to make their community safe. Resistance is difficult as it may “be 
silenced by the very panopticon or synopticon which we wish to resist” (Mathiesen 1997:
231).
Synopticism helps to explain how panoptic stmctures work to discipline and 
control society. Mathiesen’s argument is significant because he does not omit the 
oppressive functions of the Panopticon, such as the discriminatory eye that “yields at least
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part of its power” (Lyon 2006a: 46). Synopticism can be used to help explain why panoptic 
surveillance, through electronic technologies, is becoming so profound and accepted; so 
popular and enjoyable (Lyon 2006a: 47). However, several surveillance scholars strictly 
follow Foucault and do not focus on structures o f the spectacle in their attempt to 
understand surveillance (Lyon 2006a: 50). On the other hand, there is also another group of 
scholars that focus solely on the synopticon. They are panoptic critics that believe “one 
literally watches the many [and] largely fail to note how synopticism and panopticism 
potentially work in concert” (Elmer 2004: 31). Thus, those that connect surveillance and 
spectacle seem to be very limited, and in some cases make the connection but fail to make 
reference to actual theory. To discuss this convergence, work from Elmer, Niedzviecki and 
Doyle will be used. These authors make reference to popular forms o f watching that are 
relevant to modem society. The questions of tmst that will be posed will also be more 
generalizable to contemporary society.
Watching and Being Watched
To gather information strict, intmsive surveillance methods may not be necessary, 
rather softer types o f methods, such as anonymous surveys in malls, can collect abstracted 
data to stratify consumers (Elmer 2004: 38). “ATM machines, portions of the Web, and 
credit-card transactions” also collect abstracted consumer information; however, unlike the 
survey, this process is automatic (Elmer 2004: 38). In Profiling Machines, Elmer argues 
that pre-arranged categories gained through panoptic techniques can be used to facilitate 
synoptic viewing o f television programs and increase purchasing habits as well (2004: 39).
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For example, digital television “has begun to incorporate the collection of personal 
information within the act of viewing and recording programming” (Elmer 2004: 39). 
TiVo and other television recorders that collect information appeal to advertisers because 
the continuous tracking o f a consumer’s preferences allows companies to switch the 
recorded commercials to other ads that suit viewers habits and demographic profile (Elmer 
2004: 40). Moreover, TiVo’s Anonymous Viewing Information gives networks the power 
to recommend television shows to viewers because “the viewing data that TiVo collects 
also serves to link specific advertisements to a subset of consumers who have previously 
demonstrated through their viewing habits an affiliation with the product or service” 
(Elmer 2004: 40). “In short, TiVo reminds us that what we watch (synoptically) is 
becoming even more select (via panoptic process) - that viewers are getting exceptionally 
familiar, ‘more of the same’ programming” (Elmer 2004: 40). This limits access to 
difference and may act to silence the viewer from criticism that could potentially develop 
(Elmer 2004: 40). Elmer ultimately argues that consumers may not be entirely disciplined 
by the Panopticon, rather “they are both rewarded with a preset familiar world of images 
and commodities, and punished  by having to work at finding different and unfamiliar 
commodities if  they attempt to opt-out” (Elmer 2004: 49). In the end, people are pushed 
into silence and conformity through both structures working together to make resistance a 
difficult task. The familiarity that is produced and extended by watching brings forth issues 
of trust. Watching similar television shows may be a common ground for strangers to 
relate. Can the familiarity in television programs bring about relations between people that 
actually build trust and more connections?
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Niedzviecki, in his book The Peep Diaries, describes aspects o f the viewer society 
through his outlook on what he terms peep culture. Prior to electronic technologies, 
Niedzviecki states, “we were taught that spying, peering, and peeking in on people, is no 
way of behaving” (Niedzviecki 2009: 18). The parable of Peeping Tom has made this 
lesson clear in that when Lady Godiva had ordered all the townspeople to hide their eyes as 
she rode through the town naked, Tom was struck dead or blind upon failing to do so 
(Niedzviecki 2009: 18). This sent the message that “creeps who peep get what they 
deserve” (Niedzviecki 2009: 19). However, with the popularity of “urgent, expedited 
revelations regarding the problems of celebrities” spread throughout television, magazines 
and newspapers there has been a change in the lesson; we are learning that it is okay to 
participate in peep culture - “an entertainment derived from peeping into the lives of 
others” (Niedzviecki 2009: 6). In fact, programs such as blogs, Facebook and Twitter 
permit the sharing of excessive personal information, making it so that “[w]e don’t need to 
wait for the next celebrity breakdown or pregnancy to have our fun” (Niedzviecki 2009: 6). 
The attraction o f potentially having an audience, fan club or online community may be 
reason enough for people to continually share too much personal information online.
This desire to watch and be watched in Niedzviecki’s peep culture reflects the 
convergence o f synopticism and panopticism. Synopticism reflects how people share 
information online, “everything from sober family gatherings to drunken frat parties to 
kinky amateur sex parties” to demonstrate that they have something valuable to share and 
are worth watching (Niedzviecki 2009: 10). While this type of detailed information is 
revealed, the functions o f panopticism work in the background to “assign a price tag to
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every secret, scandal and crime, every seemingly commonplace domestic moment” 
(Niedzviecki 2009: 20). Niedzviecki states that in using these tools people are trying to 
regain those “things that were once provided by community”, such as the “essential 
recognition o f our humanness, intrinsic acknowledgment that we exist”, which we have 
lost in our highly organized society (2009: 27). It is done “to meet a need that our society 
seems no longer to fulfill” - to satisfy and repair the disconnect between neighbours and 
communities (Niedzviecki 2009: 26). Research has found that online communication 
actually works to provide something like community for some. In using online tools, such 
as blogs, people reported “feeling less isolated and more part o f a community, as well as 
happier with their friendships both online and o f f ’ (Niedzviecki 2009: 29). However, this 
online community and attention is the “responsibility o f corporations, governments and 
bureaucrats”; those with “economic and political power, that systematically and 
increasingly defines the criteria or frames of reference for the information which is to be 
stored, which is to be available, and which subsequently may be selected, combined and 
recombined” (Niedzviecki 2009: 27, Mathiesen 1997: 225). “As a result, despite the 
seeming appearance of rampant individualism in our society [that comes with the belief 
that the internet is an anonymous realm o f free space], we are actually more observed, 
managed, categorized, and analyzed, and ultimately more conformist than ever” 
(Niedzviecki 2009: 27). Online tools may be a way to create communities, but can the 
technology replicate the trust and strong ties that were once built in traditional 
communities? Can online communities really be backed by trust when there is no face to 
face interaction?
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Building online communities, it has also been argued, reinforces and encourages 
thought patterns and practices of individuals; to keep them in line with all that is familiar 
(Niedzviecki 2009: 31). Both synoptic and panoptic structures work together in this case to 
silence people as both voyeurs and sharers conjointly act “together in cybernetic harmony, 
each one encouraging the other, neither stopping to think about what’s happening and 
why” (Niedzviecki 2009: 19). As in the situation o f watching television, critical thoughts 
about possible negative outcomes are left out and not discussed. And when Internet users 
get caught up in the virtual experience they begin to forget about the existence of the social 
order offline, one which still holds traditional values and where there is “always the chance 
that people will see you [a blogger, or Facebook user] as damaged goods and decide they 
don’t want to have anything to do with what you’re selling” (Niedzviecki 2009: 55). The 
new ‘order’ of society is confusing and the majority of people may not know what to make 
o f it. How do online users forget about the offline social order that can use public profiles 
or online videos to judge trustworthiness? Why do they put themselves at risk?
Those who do not wish to share information online can support panoptic and 
synoptic technologies through watching news reports or television shows that depict crime. 
Doyle argues in Arresting Images how the media can provide a spectacle that creates an 
emotionally charged audience who may work together to influence or change an institution 
(Doyle 2003: 152). Specifically, he concentrates on crime and policing and how its 
injection in television can create retributive criminal justice (Doyle 2003: 152). 
Surveillance footage reproduced on news stations is a type o f promotional footage 
“because it often promotes the problem of crime and the solution of ‘law and order’ in
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general, or in particular the use of surveillance cameras themselves as a solution to 
crime”(Doyle 2003: 69). This footage creates a “new institutional role for the audience as a 
participant in surveillance” (Doyle 2003: 66). Audience members see the benefits of 
panoptic technology and engage in the role of identifying and reporting suspects. This 
impacts the justice system in that emotionally charged viewers can intensify formal 
punishment and pre-empt “the accused’s right to a fair trial, [by creating a] ‘trial by 
media’” (Doyle 2003: 69). An example o f enhanced punishment through media is the 
shocking and widely broadcasted media depiction capturing a nanny slapping an infant in 
her care. The punishment given was beyond necessary because the public outcry ensured 
that “the ex-nanny [would] probably never outlive the incident, said her lawyer: ‘It was like 
taking a sledgehammer to an ant’” (Doyle 2003: 69).
These images dramatically reproduced for the puiposes of entertaining, play upon 
the theory of synopticism while still encouraging panopticism. Promotional footage 
ensures the continual use of panoptic technology and can manipulate viewers by playing on 
their fears o f crime. The structure o f the synopticon in this instance works to communicate 
to the viewers the dangers o f street crimes and how the justice system fails to aptly punish 
certain broadcasted crimes (Doyle 2003: 71). Although it may seem as though television 
has a fair portrayal o f political, high class crimes as well as low class, street crimes, the 
synopticon still works to benefit major companies and government organizations (Doyle 
2003: 71). To illustrate this, class differences are apparent in televised footage in that the 
“surveillance produced by the interaction of cameras, authorities, and broadcast television 
will be a selective one that will tend to work to the advantage of police and other dominant
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institutions and groups, and work against the less powerful” (Doyle 2003: 71). Bias exists 
in surveillance footage as well because public surveillance cameras tend to be present in 
poorer areas, and surveillance operators, who “have the power to interpret the images -  
who produce the authorized definition o f the situation -  are the ones who hold the upper 
hand,” focus on stereotyped groups (Doyle 2003: 71-72). Also, these television shows, 
such as Cops, “tend to underrepresent African Americans and Hispanics and overrepresent 
whites as police officers, while over representing minorities and under representing whites 
as criminals” (Doyle 2003: 52). Clearly these features work to reproduce inequality, only 
on a mass level because so many people have the opportunity to watch without critically 
thinking (Doyle 2003: 71).
What is vital in Doyle’s investigation is not just that television represents crime in a 
way that fosters “more punitive public attitudes towards crime”, and that these, in turn, 
directly influence the justice system in a variety o f ways, but that surveillance 
communicates to the entire population (Doyle 2003: 147). Through its screening in the 
media, surveillance has expanded its reach, “has also become more literally visual again”, 
and sends messages to the public (Doyle 2003: 154). It communicates:
That crime is everywhere; that others among us are not to be trusted, especially 
those who are visibly different; that technology rather than community is our 
safeguard; and that the answer is to surreptitiously monitor all others and report 
them to authorities, specifically the police, who are the only ones authorized to act 
in order to deal with the crime problem. (Doyle 2003: 154)
Clearly this implies that television can communicate that certain kinds of individuals in
society are untrustworthy. However, television can also communicate that other areas in
society, such as the judicial system, also cannot be trusted because they fail to provide
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satisfying results, such as accurate punishments to criminals. In this way, a question of trust 
can be posed to television as a whole. Can television communicate distrust in all members 
of society? Conversely, is there any way for television to generate trust in society?
The Synopticon and Trust
The synopticon and the Panopticon work hand in hand to de-stigmatize close 
surveillance (Lyon 2006b: 7). Through watching, society has been taught that being seen 
can be desirable which reduces the extreme behaviours of resistance that an actual case of 
the Panopticon can produce. Working together, the Panopticon and synopticon have the 
potential to control the mind and the body, making individuals silent about critical ideas or 
change. New technologies that have developed can be understood as either creating or 
destroying trust because they can be used to make or limit connections between 
individuals. For example, the Internet can be used to initiate interactions between 
strangers, but are these interactions or online groups really supported by trust? Also, 
television can possibly destroy trust by communicating to the public that no one is to be 
trusted. But television has the potential to create relationships because o f the shared 
familiarity of programs. Since these technologies can affect large masses o f individuals a 
conceptualization of trust from the discipline of sociology will be used.
Sociology and Trust
Trust is vital in the functioning of society. Without it society would fall apart 
because “very few relationships are based entirely upon what is known with certainty about 
another person, and very few relationships would endure if trust were not as strong, or
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stronger than, rational proof or personal observation” (Simmel as quoted in Misztal 1996; 
50). There is a need for trust in society because not everything can be known about 
systems, individuals, companies or motivations. Without it “only very simple forms of 
human cooperation which can be transacted on the spot are possible, and even individual 
action is much too sensitive to disruption to be capable of being planned, without tmst, 
beyond the immediately assured moment” (Luhmann 1979: 88). It is this idea of the 
significance of tmst that is important to sociology as “[sjocial theories tend to conceive of 
tmst by pointing to the range of benefits that tmst provides” (Misztal 1996: 12). Tmst can 
be viewed as a public good which is essential for the economy, effective problem solving, 
the formation o f autonomy, “fostering democratic values and as the basis for sustaining 
republican society or civic community” (Misztal 1996: 13). Traditionally, “the valuable 
public good, such as tmst, was supplied by common tradition, community and the Church” 
(Misztal 1996: 6). However, with the diminishment of these foundations for tmst, Misztal 
questions “[w]hat are the sources o f tmst now?” (1996: 6). The social sciences “have 
attempted to study [tmst], or at least register its presence, but without a great deal of effort 
being devoted to its conceptualization” (Misztal 1996: 13). The definition of tmst will be 
taken from Misztal where “to tmst is to believe that the results o f somebody’s intended 
action will be appropriate from our point of view” (Misztal 1996: 24). However, questions 
of tmst revolve around the building or backing o f tmst by elements such as electronic 
mediums or familiarity, which cannot be answered by this definition. Instead these 
elements will be looked at to see if they produce the functions o f tmst. For example, does 
television create meaningful interactions, effective problem solving, participation in
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community or encourage the formation of autonomy? Can they be a source for trust? If 
they are producing the functions o f trust, then trust has been built. To demonstrate whether 
the elements present in the synopticon generate or destroy trust, the work of Putnam, Tilly, 
Niedzveicki and Misztal will be examined.
One o f Putnam’s main concerns in his book Bowling Alone is that o f social trust, 
“not trust in government or other institutions” (Putnam 200T. 137). This is because “trust in 
other people is logically quite different from trust in institutions and political authorities” 
as a person who does not trust the provincial government will still easily trust a neighbour 
(Putnam 2001: 137). In Putnam’s examination, he discusses two specific types o f trust: thin 
and thick trust. “Trust embedded in personal relations that are strong, frequent and nested 
in wider social networks” is thick; whereas “on the other hand, trust in ‘the generalized 
other,’ like your new acquaintance from the coffee shop, also nests implicitly on some 
background of shared social expectations o f reciprocity” where reciprocity is the 
expectation of a return sometime in the future out of respect for the initial exchange 
(Putnam 2001: 136). Putnam argues that thin tmst is more useful than thick tmst “because 
it extends the radius o f tmst beyond the rosters of people whom we can know personally” 
(2001: 136). It is also useful in that it allows potential to build deeper relations by giving 
“most people - even those whom one does not know from direct experience - the benefit of 
the doubt” (Putnam 2001: 136). Having tmst in fellow citizens functions to benefit society 
in that people will “volunteer more often, contribute more to charity, participate more often 
in politics and community organizations [...] and display many other forms of civic virtue” 
(Putnam 2001: 137).
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After looking at several years o f American surveys on beliefs which question 
whether most people are trusted or that they cannot be too careful around others, Putnam 
finds that “every year fewer and fewer o f us aver that ‘most people can be trusted’” 
(Putnam 2001: 140). Even younger generations are following this pattern o f belief, “telling 
us that in their experience most people really aren’t trustworthy” (Putnam 2001: 142). As a 
result, Putnam suggests that “perhaps thick trust - confidence in personal friends - is as 
strong as ever” but that consequently, thin trust - the “crucial emollient for large complex 
societies like ours - is becoming rarer” (2001; 145). Being a reflection of the inner self, this 
can play a role in people’s attitudes or behaviours in actual society, where social distrust 
may reflect “personal cynicism, paranoia, and even projections o f one’s own dishonest 
inclinations” (Putnam 2001: 138). This may also play a role in the call for enhanced law 
enforcement as “if  the handshake is no longer binding and reassuring, perhaps the 
notarized contract, the disposition, and the subpoena will work almost as well” (Putnam 
2001: 145). With trust, communication between individuals can easily initiate and build a 
starting point for more deeper and meaningful relations to develop. Since there is a lack of 
generalized trust, people may find solace in things such as watching the same television 
programs and communicating electronically with other “fans”. Can those elements of the 
synopticon - television watching, familiarity and online communities - reproduce or build 
the foundations for trust to provide its various beneficial functions?
Television and Trust Building
Television does not appear to foster any kind of trust. Rather, technology and mass
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media contributed to the decline of social interaction that can damage trust. Putnam argues 
that “news and entertainment have become increasingly individualized” where “[n]o 
longer must we coordinate our tastes and timing of others in order to enjoy the rarest 
culture or the most esoteric information” (2001: 216). With the average American 
estimated at watching “roughly four hours per day” and the “single most important 
consequence of the television revolution” being the idea that viewers now enjoy being at 
home, television can have the effect of cutting into time for social interactions. Viewing is 
a form of leisure that is often privatized, and “just as television privatizes our leisure time, 
it also privatizes our civic activity, dampening our interactions with one another even more 
than it dampens individual political activity” (Putnam 2001: 229). It can have an effect on 
relationships in that “more time for TV means less time for social life”, leaving less 
opportunities to successfully develop thin trust (Putnam 2001: 238). A way that television 
can potentially encourage relationships and civic participation may be watching the news 
as “TV news viewing is positively associated with civic involvement” (2001: 220). 
However, with “[mjost of the time, energy and creativity of electronic media [...] devoted 
not to news, but to entertainment” participation in civic activities decreases (Putnam 2001 : 
221). Altogether, as “[wjatching TV, videos, and computer windows onto cyberspace is 
everm ore common [and sharing] communal activities is ever less [common]” television 
decreases the amount of time available to create strong ties or deeper relations with others 
(Putnam 2001: 245).
The familiarity that Elmer touches on may seem like some ground that can build 
relations between people. This is partially because it is possible for those watching to feel
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as if they do have a connection through television. Television personalities can offer “false 
sense of companionship, [that make] people fee l  intimate, informed, clever, busy and 
important. The result is a kind of ‘remote-control politics,’ in which we as viewers fe e l  
engaged with our community without the effort of actually being engaged” (Putnam 2001 : 
242). Feeling as though they are engaged, people may not participate in actual events. This 
may act to stop actual civic participation and any chance at developing thin trust. 
Familiarity can also generate connections between individuals because discussions can 
stem from popular television shows between coworkers, acquaintances and even strangers. 
However, this connection does not necessarily demonstrate any meaningful interaction or 
trust. That is, although “[t]he bonds nurtured by these common experiences are 
psychologically compelling, [they] are generally not sociologically compelling, in the 
sense of leading to action” (Putnam 2001: 244). Like “two kids in a sandbox, each playing 
with a toy and not interacting with each other”, “public spectacles leave us at that arrested 
stage o f development, rarely moving beyond parallel attentiveness to the same external 
stimulus” (Putnam 2001; 244). Television does not lead to action beyond its goals of 
entertaining and keeping eyes glued to the screen. Any effective ideas that could occur are 
hindered or geared towards the ideals communicated by the media. Doyle’s argument acts 
to further demonstrate how television viewing can destroy chances at thin trust because of 
its messages to the public. However, this message extends to government and other 
powerful institutions as well, furthering distrust. Although it may seem as though 
audiences are empowered because of this chance to scrutinize the powerful, “[w]hat 
becomes news and consequently what we ‘view’ is selected for us by a smaller number of
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editors and procedures according to institutionally developed criteria” (Innes 1999: 273). 
Ultimately, the media has “its own set of guiding principles and objectives” that are 
followed and supported by a large audience who view these programs (Innes 1999: 273). 
Thoughts o f action are geared towards these objectives of media and the synopticon works 
to stop any type o f critical thought.
Online Communities and a False Sense of Trust
A response to online communities and whether they are backed by actual trust or 
can produce trust may be met by Tilly’s discussion o f trust networks. He notes that 
“[ajlthough some trust relationships remain purely dyadic for the most part they operate 
within larger networks of similar relationships” (Tilly 2005: 12). Online communities may 
be built by familiar thought patterns or tastes behveen members; however this does not 
fulfill the idea o f a trust network. Trust networks are defined as “[rjamified interpersonal 
connections consisting of mainly strong ties, within which people set valued, 
consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes or 
failures of others” (Tilly 2005: 14). Online communities, where individuals connect with 
anonymous strangers, may fall under “single-stranded networks containing few triads and 
sustaining little intimacy among their nodes [which] rarely or never become trust 
networks” (Tilly 2005: 13). This is partially due to the fact that online users can choose to 
leave communities guilt free and at no risk because there is no obligation to stay. Though 
having similar thought patterns, making connections in the virtual world are not likely to 
persist in reality and thus the strong ties that are formed by trust are not created online.
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Take, for example, social movements where members take collective action with other 
members who “have strong ideas about what is wrong in the world” (Henslin, Glenday, 
Duffy and Pupo 2004: 435). Activists who “form international alliances rely increasingly 
on electronic communication, most recently the internet and portable mobile devices”, but 
they fail by “reducing the influence of ideology on personal involvement in social 
movements” (Tilly 2005: 155, 156). This creates “loosely structured networks, rather than 
the relatively dense networks of earlier social movements” (Tilly 2005: 156). As “social 
movements [become] increasingly vulnerable to problems of coordination, control and 
commitment”, it seems that the Internet and online communities cannot create the same, 
meaningful or committed bonds that strong social ties could (Tilly 2005: 156). The 
implication is that if  trust was developed, successful social movements would be produced 
and problems would likely be electrically solved and real social change initiated.
Two factors can be used to explain why online users may forget about the offline 
social order and why they participate in risky behaviours. The first factor is because 
traditional communities, in which “people are typically available to each other in person”, 
and where “the trust emanating from ‘looking each other in the eye’, from the deal sealed 
with the handshake and so on” is what held social relationships together, have been lost 
(Lyon 2001: 15, 16). Through this, people have lost the feeling that they are “ordinary and 
normal and deserving of everyday human interaction” (Niedzveicki 2009: 27). The second 
factor is related to the first: since community has been lost, so too are the structures to 
educate newer generations that “tell us who we are, whom we should trust, [and] how we 
should live” (Niedzviecki 2009: 147). Facing the “ongoing process o f globalization [...]
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modem industrial nations are being forced to redefine and articulate new collective values 
and aspirations” (Misztal 1996; 4). However, online communities cannot build these 
values. Rather, in trying to achieve recognition that used to come with community, users 
participate in rambunctious behaviours as some “actively seek out the trappings o f shame 
as a way to set [them] apart from the anonymous, easily ignored mass” (Niedzviecki 2009; 
147). These acts almost replicate the behaviours of the panoptic prisoners who would do 
anything to resist the gaze. Whether these acts or beliefs expressed on the Internet are true 
or not, they can have real world consequences as “[a]s the various college students who 
have been themselves denied jobs and even jailed based on their public profiles can attest” 
(Niedzviecki 2009: 269).
The online virtual world is not a space where a “redefinition of rules [could occur] 
by which [we] stracture [our] existence” (Misztal 1996: 4). This is because online 
communities and programs are “inextricably connected to forces of bureaucracy, 
capitalism, and law and order” that keep society functioning in appropriate ways 
(Niedzviecki 2009: 269). It is not a reliable place to look to for social solidarity, 
cooperation and consensus because of this connection. It further damages the potential to 
create tmst in society because “if people could know and tmst each other in an intrinsic 
communal way, could see us all for who we really are, we would not have seen this rise of 
Peep culture in the first place” (Niedzviecki 2009: 269). The Internet provides an outlet for 
people to display untrustworthy behaviour which can further distmst in some members o f 
society. Tmst and meaningful social relations have been lost that could function to prevent 
extreme behaviours. Instead, there seems to be a reliance on other mechanisms to maintain
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social order.
The Synopticon, Sociology and Trust
Trust in sociology is understood as providing a range o f benefits to society. 
However, the technology that is becoming more commonly used and watched does not 
provide ample opportunity to build trust that provides beneficial functions, such as 
meaningful social interactions, effective ideas for problem solving, strong ties, preventing 
harm or maintaining the social order. It can, in fact, have the opposite effect and destroy the 
thin trust that could be used to create communities. As stated, watching television stops 
interactions necessary to build trust, while its programs can either cause distrust or hinder 
conversations that may be grounds for critical thought or social change. Online 
communities fail to truly provide trust networks as attempting to gather together offline 
demonstrates a lack of commitment. They also fail to create the community that is longed 
for, and, in its absence, individuals act in shameful and distrustful ways to gain attention 
and in return, suffer institutional consequences by law or bureaucracy. The Internet cannot 
facilitate the function of trust that would create “patterns of normalcy” and values (Misztal 
1996; 4). Altogether, it shows that these media cannot supply or serve as sources for 
interactions that are strong enough to foster trust in society. Reliance is placed upon other 
systems, such as law or strict standards, to uphold the social order where trust once 
functioned. As a result, we may be demanding more surveillance to provide us with safety 
in our own neighbourhoods, eroding the potential for social trust.
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Chapter 3 
(In)Security and Trust 
Everyday we are met with a challenge o f security that requires us to prove our 
identity and legibility by providing acceptable documents. Security is the fact or state o f 
being secure, that includes taking measures to prevent illegal entry, sabotage, or escape. 
The task of security procedures and the reason why they are in service is to produce a state 
or feeling of being safe and protected. And increasingly surveillance is used as a means to 
establish this publicly. However, it has been argued that security seems to be less and less 
concerned about “reacting to, controlling or prosecuting crime”, the more conventional 
viewpoints o f policing, and more concerned about “addressing the conditions precedent to 
it” (Aas, Gundhus and Lomell 2009: 2). This means that security is more concerned about 
predictability that can be accomplished using surveillance technology to help identify or 
determine risk. The problem with surveillance is that the technology alone cannot 
determine risks, rather common techniques o f profiling, interpreting, sorting, and 
classifying are used with the technology; techniques that are not always neutral or free of 
biases. Surveillance can cause errors that are detrimental not only to those people who are 
unaware that they are its targets, but can cause “critical issues [of] trust and suspicion” in 
specific groups or the general public (Aas, Gundhus and Lomell 2009: 1). The use o f an 
immense amount of security technology can raise questions about where trust from 
society’s members is placed; is it placed more in security technology and less in each 
other? And also raise questions about what happens to the trust when the technology fails. 
In this chapter security technologies will be analyzed as well as different perspectives on
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the subject. A discussion will follow on the problems of security technology by using 
theories from Aas, Gunhus and Lomell, Andrejevic, Neyland, and Bigo. Questions of trust 
will be added and examined from the perspective o f social psychology.
Security Technology; Support and Criticisms
Surveillance practices for security can range from “high- to relatively low-tech”, 
are comprised of virtual and concrete technologies, and “their deployment ranges from 
expert to the amateur” (Zedner 2009; 257). Security technologies include; identification 
technology that “focus on personal details for purposes of entitlement, access and policing” 
such as licenses and social security cards, closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, alarm 
systems, the new body scanners at the airport; virtually any surveillance technology can be 
used to monitor for the purpose of safety (Lyon 2009; 142). They are used to recognize 
risks and establish identities for previously mundane objects that are altered to be seen as 
dangerous and needing security, such as “water bottles or other liquid containers [that] 
have at times shifted from the ordinary, comfortable and everyday into categories of 
suspicion” (Neyland 2009; 21). Furthermore, CCTV surveillance cameras are supervised 
by operators who are “also workers, subjected not only to the same capitalist regimes as 
any other labourer in late modernity but also to an emotive duress produced by the very 
technologies which earn them their living” (Smith 2009; 126). Consequently, they are 
“predominantly choosing, as a result of their subjectivities and the workplace culture in 
which they are embedded, to target and associate criminality to the young, working class 
males, ethnic minority populations, sub-cultural groups and particular forms o f mobility”
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(Smith 2009: 129). All o f these technological security practices can be “linked to power, 
governance and risk management” and have been shown to have ulterior goals other than 
public safety (Smith 2009: 133). This can be seen, for example, with CCTV in public 
spaces in which “the technology’s rapid deployment is tied to strategic 
spatial-management programmes and political-economic policies as it is primarily 
concerned with securing predictability and controlling people and movement” (Smith 
2009: 133). It is important to realize that although there is a common belief that many o f 
these security technologies have come into play mostly after 9/11, “the practice o f 
watching others in order to detect inappropriate behavior or to avert danger and risk is 
nothing new” (Lyon 2003: I). 9/11 enabled heightened security surveillance practices in 
the United States, which spread to other countries such as Canada and Britain. Rather than 
being generated for safety out of the interests of others, it has been argued that “many 
well-meaning initiatives since September 11 both fall short o f promises made for them and 
at the same time create new problems that will limit freedom of movement and 
self-determination, and augment the power and the accountability of governments and 
corporations [...] 9/11 is pushing the pendulum from care to control” (Lyon 2003: 11).
The debate surrounding “new technologies and their security effects has been 
polarised”, with critics tending “to portray the introduction o f new technologies as 
heralding the advent of a dystopian and totalitarian society”, and supporters celebrating the 
new technology “as ‘silver bullets’, offering the possibility of radically reduced levels of 
crime and more efficient and effective policing” (Aas, Gunhus and Lomell 2009: 3). 
Supporters often view security technologies as an effective method to reduce threats of
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violence and ensure community safety. This is partly due to the ostensible technical 
neutrality as the technology “appears as reasonable and not subjected to classic racism” 
(Bigo 2006: 60). It may also be viewed as a solution to demands for equality because it has 
the ability to bring about justice, as surveillance through “identifying citizens may also be 
the means o f ensuring their entitlements and their rights”, even in places such as 
interrogation rooms (Lyon 2009: 44). Furthermore, a crisis may lend support to the idea of 
a technical solution. For example, “[i]n the immediate aftermath o f September 11, few 
people challenged the idea that the sovereignty and integrity of the body o f the US nation 
were at stake [...] instead they participated in the creation of a new wave of patriotism, an 
appeal to be more protected and a will to revenge” (Bigo 2006: 52). However, the problem 
with such support for security technology is that it can produce an over-reliance on 
technology to solve security problems that undermine other solutions such as “developing 
reasonable antiterrorist policies” (Bigo 2006: 60). It is clear that the idea of maximum or 
guaranteed security is “simply unattainable” and a reliance on security technology to 
provide this “carries with it some avoidable problems” that become evident when the 
technology fails to sustain the security that it promises (Lyon 2003: 16). Problems with 
security technologies include the erosion of social trust through forms o f insecurity and 
suspicion, its potential to be overly intrusive, as well as its ability to cause “conditions that 
are not merely disagreeable, but unjust and unfree” (Lyon 2003: 6).
Problems with Security Technology
“[DJespite avowedly being dedicated to the endgame of security,” surveillance
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technology may erode social trust in the way that it “construct[s] new dimensions of 
insecurity” (Zedner 2009: 265). Aas et al. use the term “(in)security” to depict how the two 
opposed concepts are deeply intertwined with each other and demonstrate how security 
technology inherently produces feelings of insecurity. Insecurity can be defined as feeling 
unsafe or vulnerable, feelings that can become instilled through making something that 
was once considered safe more dangerous. This can occur, for example, where surveillance 
cameras are set up in areas that are not considered particularly dangerous such as 
classrooms and elevators. In doing this new attitudes may develop regarding places, people 
and environments that are surveilled. This may result in “social relations [that become] 
marked by distrust and uncertainty, particularly with regard to certain social groups 
defined [or targeted] as security threats” (Aas, Gunhus and Lomell 2009: 2). 9/11 has 
increased these feelings of anxiety because the threat became ambiguous as the “novel 
element o f the so-called war on terror was that the enemy’s weaponry took the familiar 
form of passenger jets, cars, computer code, and even the daily mail” (Andrejevic 2007: 
168). When this happens there is a “need for verification technologies [that] multiplies 
along with responsibility of individuals for monitoring a climate o f proliferating risk” 
(Andrejevic 2007: 168). Security technologies may be viewed as ways to maintain safety, 
but they also may cause issues of distrust in others by generating feelings o f suspicion. This 
raises questions about the level of trust between members of society and where that trust 
goes when too much security technology is put in place.
Suspicion is a general lack o f trust in a person or a lack o f certainty. It can be 
manufactured by security technologies and is another of its problems that can lead to the
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erosion of social trust. The effects o f 9/11 are a perfect example to demonstrate how 
surveillance creates suspicion. After the attacks, the United States heightened domestic 
security practices, enlarging the culture or climate o f suspicion that “potentially taints all 
reputations and makes surveiller^' o f us all" (Lyon 2003: 10). Citizens then began to 
participate in surveillance procedures, through encouragement by government departments 
such as the Department of Homeland Security, by looking out for questionable behaviour 
or unusual packages; elements of terrorist activities that security experts have defined as 
possible threats. The problem with terror is that the definitions given by these experts are 
unclear and left mostly to interpretation. For example, a British intelligence agency 
describes a letter bomb as “probably [having] received fairly rough handling in the post 
and so is unlikely to detonate through being moved, but any attempt at opening it may set it 
o ff’ (Neyland 2009: 27). This identification includes vague detail and use the language of 
uncertainty that could make any letter seem suspicious. A more substantial problem ensues 
when this vagueness and uncertainty extends to terrorist descriptions where “[t]he 
foreigner [who is now stereotyped as the terrorist] is no longer the non citizen, he is the one 
with the strange, bizarre and slightly deviant abnormal behaviour, or the opposite, having 
such normal behaviour that it seems suspicious” (Bigo 2006: 60). Trust may not be so 
easily given to strangers with such general descriptions o f danger and the responsibility of 
safety may be given to security experts as procedures to manage the threat are followed 
which suggests “who should be taking responsibility for managing the risk of letter bombs” 
or suspicious people (Neyland 2009: 26). Given the circulation of uncertain elements, 
questions about whether security procedures are trusted or ignored may be raised.
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Stereotypes can easily be transmitted into feelings of suspicion, especially after 
9/11 which led to targeting “along ‘racial’ lines, focusing on ‘Arab’ populations in 
particular” as categories of suspicion (Lyon 2003: 31). With surveillance technology 
enhancing the amount and extent o f observation of these groups, more and more 
stereotyped groups may face unjust conditions thanks to a technique called profiling. 
Profiling is used by security to be able to “anticipate before the act, who is going to commit 
an offence and what their actions will be in the future” (Bigo 2006: 62). The process is 
similar to the profiling of customers by corporations that use patterns in trends and 
behaviours to anticipate future purchases. Profiling can be dangerous because those who 
have been “judged to be a sign of potential danger” are put under a more serious 
surveillance regime (Bigo 2006: 59). This is faced mostly by those people “constructed as a 
specific ‘minority’, [or] ‘abnormal’ group, [because they are viewed as] a group with 
virtually violent behaviour, even if this behaviour has never been actualized” (Bigo 2006: 
61). The consequences of improper interpretation can be detrimental as “effective controls 
and coercive restrictions o f freedom are concentrated on specific targets” (Bigo 2006: 63). 
Some of these controls of minorities were in place long before 9/11, but 9/11 has acted to 
construct these individuals “as ‘invisible and powerful enemies in networks’”, justifying 
“the profiling of certain people’s potential behaviour, especially if  they are [considered] 
‘on the m ove” ’ (Bigo 2006: 63). Using profiling and security technologies to fabricate 
“body identification as a sign of a predictable pattern of behaviour” fails because it is based 
on assumptions, yet it has the power to exclude its targets from everyday activities and life 
chances (Bigo 2006: 63). How does the targeting of stereotyped groups affect their level of
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trust in society and government?
Another failure o f security technology is its creation o f a state o f perpetual fear that 
may only, seemingly, be resisted by being constantly prepared. After 9/11, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) was developed in the United States to secure the country 
from environmental disasters and preserve freedoms (Homeland Security Website). 
Included in its mission to secure the homeland was a section on terrorism which “is 
portrayed as a form of second nature: an additional uncontrollable force in the world, just 
as independent o f national policy as a tsunami or earthquake” (Andrejevic 2007: 182). To 
protect from this threat, the DHS encouraged U.S. citizens “to take responsibility for 
preparing for catastrophes,” and advised citizens to participate “in an ongoing homeland 
security surveillance program against terror” (Andrejevic 2007: 164). Andrejevic notes 
that “[rjather than conserving, citizens are urged to consume and seek out investment 
opportunities that disconcertingly capitalize on the terrorist threat” (2007: 164). In the 
DHS’s attempt to get citizens acquiring “the necessary equipment and training to take 
duties offloaded on them by the state”, individuals began to take “on the duties of being a 
good consumer” and invested in security technologies such as encoding devices, metal 
detectors and even duck tape (Andrejevic 2007: 165, 183). Citizens were also to assume 
their role in the war on terror by taking responsibility “as they [went] about their daily lives 
at work, at home and at school” (Andrejevic 2007: 173). Consuming security technologies 
for everyday activities not only reminds people o f “the failings of the government 
bureaucracies in securing the nation against terrorists” but also echoes the idea that citizens 
need to protect themselves by following the advice distributed by these same government
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bureaucracies (Andrejevic 2007; 165). Safety and protection is no longer only in the hands 
o f the state, but is also, and more importantly, in the hands of citizens who can choose to 
consume or participate in safe practices. This definitely raises questions about the trust 
society places in the government. If the technologies used by the security departments of 
the government are not working, then how is society able to place trust in the government? 
Also, how can society place trust in safety equipment that even when used by professionals 
do not work?
Although the point o f taking responsibility and being prepared is to abolish fear, the 
account o f preparation “entails not an abolition o f fear but a stance o f perpetual anxious 
diligence”: a state that is good for security businesses (Andrejevic 2007: 167). Andrejevic 
argues in the midst of 9/11 what has emerged is “the individualization of warfare and [...] 
the individualization o f defense” (2007: 182). The message to the people in the United 
States was to be prepared, which meant anything from buying dust masks to the Executive 
Chute, “a parachute for those who work in skyscrapers” (Andrejevic 2007: 183). Security 
industries that are privatized realize that “anxiety is especially productive, and risk can be 
leveraged for profit” which means that a state of perpetual fear, conveniently created 
through the generalized risk that was provided by terrorism, is good for business 
(Andrejevic 2007: 184). This was not only realized after 9/11, but had been realized prior 
to the event and can be seen in the invention o f previous security technologies. The sports 
utility vehicle (SUV), for example, was advertised as a safety vehicle, but turned out to 
offer less protection to other vehicles on the road as it actually promotes aggressive driving 
and reduces visibility (Zedner 2009: 268). Thus, the “selling o f the SUV as a mobile
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security environment might better be read as a marketing ploy that plays on people’s 
insecurities” (Zedner 2009; 268). Again, this causes insecurity and does not necessarily 
obliterate fears. The problem with the privatization of security industry is that it profits 
from fear and anxiety. Will trust continually be put in the hands o f the technology that is 
supposed to create safety? Or will individuals come to the realization that buying into 
security creates more insecurity?
Security Technology and Trust
Despite all of the problems and failures of technology, people are still consuming 
surveillance technology; as Andrejevic makes clear, making America safe is a 215 billion 
dollar a year business (2007: 165). Also, security procedures are still in service with little 
resistance from individuals as after a while, “these technologies seem so banal (such as ID 
checks in many countries, military with heavy armaments in public places, and biometric 
identifiers) that nobody (including judges) asks for their legitimacy and their efficiency 
after a certain period of time” (Bigo 2006: 49). With both monetary support and acceptance 
it seems as though the technology and its services are trusted. However, social trust is 
affected in the way that a climate o f suspicion has expanded, insecurity has risen and the 
unjust conditions have grown from intrusive surveillance techniques. How does the 
insecurity o f security technology affect society’s trust in government and between its 
members? Can too much security act to destroy trust? Or can people become accustomed 
to its presence and continue to trust others? How do security techniques and technology 
affect the levels of trust between stereotyped groups, government and society? To attempt
65
to answer these questions an understanding of trust will be taken from the discipline of 
social psychology.
Social Psychology and Trust
Within the frame of social psychology, the concept and use o f trust is limited, but 
significant when applied to security technology. Social psychology “examines the 
influence of social processes in the way people think, feel and behave” (Westen 2002; 
593). It can be applied to the area of security because the “expert-labelled social problems 
as types of ‘risks’, social behaviours as ‘risky’ or types o f people at ‘risk’ are all held to 
comply with efforts to govern societies according to the principle that individuals” need to 
take responsibility for the security o f their families and themselves (Wilkinson 2006: 36). 
Individual responsibility for security implies a type of lateral surveillance which “[rjather 
than strengthening communities and building partnerships, [...] destroys trust and 
produces interpassitivity” (Chan 2008: 225). Privatization of security also introduces a 
new portrayal o f the risk society as comprised o f “an aggregate o f individuals all sharing in 
common cultural experiences o f risk and all bearing personal responsibility for their fates” 
(Wilkinson 2006: 36). With risk and security being made into more o f an individual 
problem propelled by privatization and government encouragement, social psychology 
becomes a useful discipline to examine trust because it looks at individual choices of trust 
and distrust. It uses social settings and situations as important factors in the reasoning for 
an individual’s decision to trust or distrust. The definition that will be taken from this 
discipline will be from Rotter’s work in which trust is a “generalized expectancy held by an
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individual that the word, promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group 
can be relied on” (Rotter 1971: 444). To look at trust in security, works from Rotter, 
Hardin, Yamagishi, Mirowsky and Ross, and Glover will be examined.
Rotter: Expectancies and Trust
In psychology, “most argue that we learn to trust” based on the teachings o f parents 
to infants (Cook, Hardin and Levi 2005: 22). Similarly, “Rotter and other social 
psychologists focus on the capacity for trust as learned from experience” (Cook, Hardin 
and Levi 2005: 23). Though Rotter’s work is older, it has been influential to developing 
new strategies o f trust measurement and understanding. As the modem world changes and 
grows with more and more surveillance. Rotter’s work becomes meaningful because “the 
notion that the major portion of human social behaviour is learned or modifiable” is 
applied (Rotter 1972: 4). He bases his work from social learning theory, which “was 
developed as an attempt to account for human behaviour in relatively complex social 
situations” (Rotter 1972: 1). Situations determine the tmsting or distrusting response 
because “expectancies generalize along lines of perceived similarity, relatively stable 
modes o f responding develop, and a learned basis for a theory o f personality is developed” 
(Rotter 1971: 445). Rotter preferred to look at situations because “common sense [would 
be] based on an understanding o f a culture rather than reading from an instrument” (Rotter 
1972: 13). Similar to most literature on trust. Rotter agrees that there are “enormous 
personal costs o f excessive distrust” (Rotter 1980: l).W ith an increase of distrust in society 
that he argues is present in the 1970s and 1980s, Rotter states that “the attempt to
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decelerate what appears to be increasing distrust and to build a society in which people 
trust each other may, in itself, demand changes in the behaviors of individuals and groups 
that constitute positive social change” (Rotter 1971: 444). This means that changes must be 
made on a large scale. Expectancies of distrust can change only when people work together 
to create generalized expectancies of trust because “expectancies in each situation are 
determined not only by specific experiences in that situation but also, to some varying 
degree, by experiences in other situations that the individual perceives as familiar” (Rotter 
1980: 2). Thus, large positive social changes can alter the environment and create trust. 
Through this he develops a hypothesis for generalized expectancy for trust or distrust and 
creates an additive test for interpersonal trust to be used in experiments (Rotter 1971: 445).
As expectancies for trust can develop from experiences, experiences can ultimately 
mean the difference between the level of trust in others and the different opportunities 
available to the individual. Hardin states that the capacity for trust is a “capacity that must 
largely be learned” (2002: 113). Judgments of trustworthiness are made “largely by 
generalization from past encounters with other people” (Hardin 2002: 113). Past 
experiences can differ by either being so positive that an individual can “optimistically take 
the risk o f cooperating” with a stranger or by being so negative that an individual 
“pessimistically avoid[s] that risk” of cooperation (Hardin 2002: 113). The stranger “is no 
different in the two cases” but “prior experiences, unrelated to him or her, are the source of 
difference” (Hardin 2002: 113). Hardin acknowledges that if  “past experiences too heavily 
represented good or poor grounds for trust, it may now take a long run o f contrary 
expectations to correct initial expectations” (2002: 113). Reassessments based on evidence
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of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness can change the initial skeptical judgment, but it is a 
process that takes time and willingness to be vulnerable: “Hence trust - the belief in 
another’s trustworthiness - has to be learned, just as any other kind o f knowledge has to be 
learned” (Hardin 2002: 114). As discussed, too much security in some areas can cause 
feelings o f insecurity and suspicion about other people, environments or objects. But it 
cannot create the experiences of facing an untrustworthy individual needed to attain the 
belief that others cannot be trusted. As explained in the previous chapter, watching 
television is a form of leisure that is consumed for several hours a day, and it provides a 
type of continuous exposure to dangerous or risky behaviours that generates the belief that 
others are not trustworthy. Reinforced by visible security systems seen during daily 
activities, the televisual experience may create a generalized distrust in society, especially 
when danger can occur at anytime during daily activities. If the surveillance systems 
encountered are considered justified, they may also justify distrust. However, if  there is too 
much security set up in one location and there is no experience o f the violation of trust, then 
the surveillance might not cause any feelings of insecurity or distrust.
Experiences of trust that lead to a generalized trust in society can have beneficial 
outcomes as those who have initial judgments of high trust in others have different 
opportunities than do those with low trust in others. Distrusters face an unwillingness to be 
vulnerable that can substantially affect their ability to participate in meaningful 
interactions. Yamagishi has found that distrusters lack the social intelligence necessary “to 
differentiate [between] whom to trust and whom not to trust on the basis of very specific 
cues” (Cook, Hardin and Levi 2005: 23). In this way, “their lack of social intelligence
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makes them more gullible when they do in fact engage in interactions”, teaching them “to 
distrust others even more” because they fail rather than succeed in interactions (Yamagishi 
2001: 122). Also, in “realizing their vulnerability, they avoid engaging in such 
interactions” that can lead to success or benefits thus losing potentially meaningful 
opportunities (Yamagishi 2001: 124). Thus having high trust gives us a “general optimism 
about the trustworthiness of others [that] enables us to enter mutually beneficial relations” 
(Hardin 2002: 114).
In his additive tests. Rotter found that “some people are more likely to be trusting 
than others” and from this developed tests with a differentiation between who he 
categorized as high trusters and low trusters. Like the difference in the levels of risk taking 
discussed in Yamagishi, Rotter’s categories also differ in their level o f cautiousness where 
“the high truster says: I will trust him or her until we have clear evidence that he or she 
cannot be trusted [and where the] low-truster in contrast says: I will not trust him or her 
until there is clear evidence that he or she can be trusted” (Cook, Hardin and Levi 2005: 
23). High trusters are more likely to take risks whereas low trusters are not willing to make 
themselves vulnerable. In using these two categories o f trusters, one o f Rotter’s additive 
tests discovered that high trusters “will permit a mistake or two and still trust providing the 
mistake is admitted and apology made” (Rotter 1971: 448). Rotter suggests, to a truthful 
degree, that this “point may be of significance for government and other institutions that 
have lost credibility of the public and hope to regain it” (1971: 448). Also, after reviewing 
several tests. Rotter is able to make some differences to gullibility between high trusters 
and low trusters. He states that “if trust is simply believing in communications in the
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absence o f clear or strong reasons for not believing and gullibility as believing when most 
people o f the same social group would consider belief naïve and foolish, then trust can be 
independent o f gullibility” (Rotter 1980: 2). To clarify, “to trust a stranger who has not lied 
to you before would not be gullibility; to believe a politician who has lied to you many 
times before is gullibility” (Rotter 1980: 4). In testing the differences of gullibility between 
high trusters and low trusters “no evidence was found that high trusters behaved in a way 
that can be called [...] more gullible than low trusters” (Rotter 1980: 4).
Using these tests can generate an understanding of why some still may trust the 
government and security systems when they fail. If and when a security system has failed, 
the government or security agencies have two options to restore trust. Firstly, if  members 
of society have a high amount of trust, then a clear apology made by government or 
security agencies may minimize the effects of the mistake to a considerable degree, 
allowing for more security tactics to be adopted without much protest. Gullibility enables 
the second method, which would be to get rid o f the failing security technology and replace 
it with a new one. Those that have a high level and a low level of trust would not be gullible 
because they have not seen this new system fail. The constant changes in security may also 
help lead to the expectation that security systems are always changing and create an easier 
adaptation to new security technology.
The Sense of Threat and Powerlessness
According to Mirowsky and Ross, who use the work of Rotter to discuss trust, 
distrust “makes sense where threats abound, particularly for those who feel powerless to
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prevent harm or cope with the consequences o f being victimized or exploited” (2006: 437). 
Thus, distrust can be amplified by feelings o f “threat and powerlessness”, which can be 
created by terrorism and security technology (Mirowsky and Ross 2006: 437). The 
all-encompassing threat o f terrorism, with risk and weaponry taking “the familiar form of 
passenger jets, cars, computer code and even the daily mail”, can create a threatening 
environment (Andrejevic 2007: 168). The vague descriptions of terrorist subjects and 
objects also play a role in constructing this environment because they transcend specific 
situations and enter everyday situations. Security technology causes a perpetual state of 
fear because it reminds us that we are vulnerable in numerous everyday situations and we 
constantly need protection from something or someone. Terrorism and security technology 
communicates that danger can occur at anytime; “it is almost impossible to predict or even 
imagine when and how attacks will occur” (Chan 2008: 228). This feeling of threat can 
create a sense of powerlessness, a “sense that one’s own life is shaped by forces outside of 
one’s control” (Mirowsky and Ross 2006: 438). It produces a loss of trust in others and 
culture of suspicion that can be “made up for by an increased reliance on vertical trust -  the 
trust of political and security elites” (Chan 2008: 235). As a result, people may turn to 
security technologies, either in the hands of the government or in their own hands, as a 
form of control or protection from others.
The “sense o f powerlessness that makes the effect of disorder or mistrust even 
worse” might be supplanted by a feeling of control gained by purchasing security 
technology (Mirowsky and Ross 2006: 438). This is because where powerlessness and a 
threatening environment amplifies the effect of threat on distrust, “a sense of control would
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moderate it” (Mirowsky and Ross 2006: 438). If government attempts at providing security 
fails because the technology fails, feelings of powerlessness may be averted by giving 
citizens power in allowing them to use the technology as a form of protection. Though our 
“personal knowledge is [not] infallible”, citizens may believe that the technology is being 
put to better use this way because “we tend to regard our own observations as more 
reliable, our interpretations as more sensitive, and our own judgements as more relative to 
our situation than those of other people” (Grovier 1998: 125). This may provide some relief 
regarding terrorism as threat “generates little mistrust among those who feel in control of 
their own lives, but a great deal among those who feel powerless” (Mirowsky and Ross 
2006: 438). When citizens choose to use the technology for their own protection feelings of 
powerlessness can be decreased. The technology may bring about enough o f a feeling of 
control that people can cope with personal security problems or feel that they have reduced 
their chance at victimization. However, security technology never seems to fully abolish 
fear because it can always act to remind us that danger lurks in the background of any 
situation. As such it may never be used to replace trust and only act to decrease trust 
because it instills feelings of suspicion. Perhaps only when threatening situations are not so 
frequently reported in the media and experiences o f threat are lessened the consumption of 
security technology may subside.
Minorities and Trust Issues
Those groups who have been stereotyped and targeted by surveillance may already 
face issues with trust because their “individual disadvantage [of being marked by race] is
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also associated with perceived powerlessness” (Mirowsky and Ross 2006: 439). People 
whose distrust is amplified by powerlessness and disadvantage may not have the same 
chances as those who have sources of power, such as those “with high incomes, educations. 
Whites and married persons“(Mirowsky and Ross 2006: 439-440). In turn, they may feel 
that they have no choice in some situations because the “outcomes o f situations are 
determined by forces external” to them (Mirowsky and Ross 2006: 424). Race is 
permanently visible and as such it can be a marker o f criminality and suspicion that can 
“set off more attention from agents of surveillance than others” (Glover 2008: 423, Chan 
2008: 235). The mental stress caused by being frequently stopped by security forces can 
build and become damaging to one’s sense of power; it can be a reminder to the citizen of 
colour of the “power relationship they are involved with the state” because it is the police 
who speak for the state and are constantly presuming guilt (Glover 2008: 244). Mental and 
physical well being can be sacrificed since “while racial profile processes interact with the 
body and the mind, the mental coercion that surrounds the encounters create unique 
alienating relations with the state that go beyond the physical” (Glover 2008: 246 - 247). In 
this way, these targeted groups face a form of alienation from those state departments that 
are supposed to protect them. It is a loss of innocence that reinforces unequal treatment by 
the state and communicates that people o f colour do not have a chance to receive their 
desired outcomes - “the freedom from unwarranted state intervention” and the expectation 
to be protected by full economic and political rights as equal citizens (Glover 2008: 250, 
245). 9/11 has acted to increase security checks on these groups and cause “‘racially 
motivated’ attacks, discrimination and harassment, threats, property damage and verbal
74
assaults in public against Arab, Muslim and Sikh Australians” by citizens encouraged to 
participate in the war on terror (Chan 2008: 234). Chan argues that “[t]he apparently 
pervasive and routine nature of such incidents suggests that the culture of suspicion has in 
fact developed into a culture of hatred” (2008: 233).
The consistency of threats, the lack of actual protection from police, and the 
feelings of powerlessness from being constantly stopped at security checks would certainly 
lower levels o f trust in society by these groups. However, what Grover discovers is that 
tolerance seems to build from continual experiences as an interviewee in Grover's article 
states: “We just learn to aceept it as part o f our interaction with law enforcement” (Glover 
2008: 253). Within minority groups and “communities of color, discussions about how to 
negotiate in a racial state become a part of community discourse. For young males of color 
in particular, a specific discourse about expectations from law enforcement is circulated as 
very purposeful communication for basic survival concerns” (Glover 2008: 253). This 
tolerance demonstrates that with enough experience an expectation begins to develop that 
can help a person get through the day without feeling like a targeted suspect. Some may 
begin to think that this is just the way things are handled, accept the procedures of security 
and move on. However, this tolerance does not build trust as it seems to be more the 
acceptance o f system imperfections and distortions.
Security, Social Psychology and Trust
Overall, relying on security technology as a solution to safety issues may end up 
creating insecurity and further feelings o f distrust. Making the fight against terror and risk
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an individual problem can also spoil any chance at developing or maintaining trust because 
it takes away from social interactions that can build trust and actually provide feelings of 
security. Television programs and other media can be the sources that justify security 
technology, and security technology, in itself, can be a reminder that danger is found in all 
comers of everyday life. These both work to create a perpetual state of threat and feelings 
of powerlessness that can cause a generalized distrust between members of society. And 
where trust is lost in each other it is put into government, but this fails because its methods 
for safety do not always work. Tmst also fails because the government puts responsibility 
back in the hands of individuals who relied to some degree and perhaps even trusted the 
government to begin with. In buying into security technology and participating in lateral 
surveillance to downplay the feelings of powerlessness we lose the ability to put tmst in 
each other, which can actually be the source for safety. As Chan makes clear, “[i]f crime 
control is ultimately to engender social order and physical security, then a culture of 
suspicion is the anti-thesis of order and security because it undermines the ontological 
security of social interactions” (2008: 234). The only possible solution to creating trust in 
surveillance for security may be to “tum lateral surveillance on its head” (Chan 2008: 236). 
That is, “[b]y looking out for each other, instead of spying on each other, we may come 
close to the original idea of building strong and resilient communities” (Chan 2008: 236). 




Resistance and Trust 
As surveillance plays a significant role in contemporary society, so too is the 
recognition of its impacts, be it through movies, newspapers or other popular media. 
Although some surveillance devices have been made subtle and others rendered almost 
completely opaque, it does not mean that people are unaware o f how some of their 
everyday lives are monitored (Lyon 2001: 127). While some may acquiesce to 
surveillance, others may feel the threat that surveillance generates and believe that they are 
vulnerable to privacy invasions (Lyon 2001: 127). To deal with problem large groups or 
organizations have been created to help resist surveillance and protect rights to privacy. 
Rights, however, do not always hold up in all surveillance situations, such as in trying to 
resist ‘vancams’ which photograph the license plate of speeders (Gilliom 2006: 111). 
Smaller movements by random, ordinary people are becoming more commonplace and 
performed on a daily basis. The seriousness o f these movements can vary depending on 
how badly individuals want or need to resist surveillance, with some people resisting 
because the surveillance has been deemed sneaky or inappropriate and others resisting to 
be able move on with everyday life activities. Resistance, thus, may hold key issues o f trust 
as it may be part of the reasons why people choose to resist, in that they decide the 
organization that is collecting the information is untrustworthy. It may also be an issue 
faced by those who are overwhelmed by surveillance because it demonstrates an absence 
o f trust by the organization or institution conducting the surveillance. In some cases those 
surveilled are so underprivileged that they need to resist to survive, which raises questions
77
about how much trust they are offered and the extent to which a lack of trust can affect their 
lives. Importantly, as Gilliom points out, since surveillance is ubiquitous in modem society 
“resistance must be understood as acting within that context and not something that can 
prevent or undo it in any way” (2006: 114). Smaller movements made by individuals or 
small groups may be a new pattern of resistance that marks a “more definitive polities in 
our time” (Gilliom 2006: 122). To explain resistance, the work of Foucault, Lyon, Yar, 
Marx, Gilliom and Genosko will be discussed.
Power-Knowledge and Resistance
For Foucault, power, knowledge and resistance are linked together. He discusses 
how power and knowledge are connected as a type of “power-knowledge” (Foucault 1978: 
98). They merge and are not external to each other for the reason that “different forms o f 
discourse - self-examination, questionings, admissions, interpretations, interviews - [are] 
the vehicle o f a kind o f incessant back and forth movement of subjugation and schemas of 
knowledge” (Foucault 1978: 98). Power can demand knowledge and knowledge can attain 
control and power. Resistance is linked to power as “[wjhere there is power, there is 
resistance” (Foucault 1978: 95). Points of resistance that “play the role of adversary, target, 
support, or handle in power relations [...] are present everywhere in the power network” 
(Foucault 1978: 95). This demonstrates that resistance should be expected everywhere that 
power is exercised, and because of this there is “no single great Refusal, no soul or revolt, 
source of all rebellions, or pure law o f the revolutionary” (Foucault 1978: 95-96). Rather, 
power can be found everywhere and as a result there is a “plurality o f resistances, each of
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them a special case; resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are 
spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant or violent; still others that are quick to 
compromise, interested or sacrificial” (Foucault 1978; 96). Resistance is an “irreducible 
opposite” of power that is “spread over time and space at varying densities, at times 
mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body, 
certain moments in life, certain types of behaviour” (Foucault 1978: 96). In this way 
resistance is not aberrant. It is to be anticipated where there is power and can occur for 
different reasons to try to defy power. Surveillance ean be understood as an attempt to 
exercise power by exerting control over secrecy and privacy. Eliminating secrets would 
allow knowledge to be accumulated about the private lives of individuals that could be 
used to control them. How this is resisted by large groups will be first discussed.
Resistance and Large Organizations
The majority of surveillance literature demonstrates that large organizational 
movements directed against surveillance are either failing or extremely limited. In his 
chapter “The politics of surveillance” Lyon (2001) makes clear points about why this may 
be occurring. Part of what hinders the success o f resistance is the legal claim to rights. 
Privacy violations are popular claims as to why surveillance is harmful to the public; 
however the legal realm of data protection and privacy law has severe limitations as the 
“actual gains are far from earth shaking and social movements in this area are up against 
considerable odds” (Lyon 2001: 136). Lyon suggests that because features such as 
convenience, speed and security are involved with the use of technology, part of the
79
problem is that the “worrisome or unsocial” aspects appear merely as the price to pay for 
technological solutions or gains (2001: 136). Also, the effects of surveillance which work 
to disadvantage some groups over others “can be [merely] a side-effect o f policies meant to 
achieve other ends” making it hard to fight using claims to rights because disadvantages to 
groups are not part of the overall goals (Lyon 2001: 136). This makes it easier for 
governments or corporations “that stand to gain from surveillance [to be in a] good position 
to make their case” thus allowing surveillance practices to be more aceeptable (Lyon 2001 : 
136). In addition, companies can shape the way the public views the surveillance system or 
device (Lyon 2001: 139). Technology can be construed or constructed to be seen as “soft 
and malleable, it may be seen as something that ean be shaped to appropriate ends or if 
necessary curbed” (Lyon 2001: 139). This flexible construction may reduce potential 
resistance because it can steer away from sharp criticism that definitive ends could create 
and change to allow for public approval (Lyon 2001: 139).
Other contributions to the limitations of resistance are the shortcomings of privacy 
rights as well as the lack of concern from the public. In the online sector privacy can be 
extremely limited for a number of reasons. First, cookies as well as other automated data 
collection programs are considered optional, but because of the browsing limitations when 
they are deelined they are likely accepted. This restrains protection using privacy as a right 
because “regulations against selling personal information do not cover situations in which 
the user has ‘consented’ to share their information” (Yar 2006: 144). Second, since the 
Internet is comprised of various Websites that are unregulated, a problem of “legal 
pluralism” is created where “nothing prevents websites and information services located in
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non-regulated or under-regulated territories from collecting and selling on such 
information” (Yar 2006: 144). This means that not only can users’ information be collected 
without their knowledge, but that it can also be sold to the highest bidder, which in some 
cases can even include criminals (Yar 2006: 145). If these situations have not been 
publicized, they might not cause public concern as “culturally, in the U.S.A, privacy is not 
seen as an issue worth fighting for” (Lyon 2001: 138). This, Lyon points out, is in stark 
contrast to issues that are still being protested, such as the use of laboratory animals or 
biotechnology used to produce better pesticides and higher crop rates (Lyon 2001: 138). 
Not only may this be due, again, to a lack o f useful rights and laws, but also because of 
acquiescence to surveillance procedures; there simply is not the same lightening rod effect 
with surveillance that helpless animals or the tampering o f nature has on the majority of 
people (Lyon 2001: 139).
Personal Protection or Resistance?
Encryption is a technique or tool “associated with encoding or scrambling data in 
such ways as to render it incomprehensible to others not in possession of a ‘key’ that is 
needed to decipher the data into its legible form” (Yar 2006: 156). It is a form o f resistance 
used by those who wish to avoid prying eyes and by those who wish to protect their 
personal information against potential hackers or criminals. It is used by “business and 
individual Internet users concerned about the possibility that their competitor or their or 
foreign governments may intercept sensitive communications” (Yar 2006: 149). However, 
because of the dilemma encryption can cause for criminal justice actors whose jobs include
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detecting online criminals and reducing “the potential abuse of internet privacy by greater 
surveillance and monitoring o f people’s activities,” the privacy and confidentiality o f all 
online communications are at risk (Yar 2006; 140). These concerns of law enforcement 
agencies lead to attempts of the statutory regulation of encryption that were constantly 
debated by privacy campaigners (Yar 2006: 149). These debates continued over the past 
decade until the aftermath o f 9/11 where “the tide finally turned in favour o f law 
enforcement and against computer privacy activists” (Yar 2006: 150). Interestingly 
enough, the giving of encryption keys or the back doors of safety software to law 
enforcement agencies in reality does little to nothing to stop criminals or criminal 
organizations from creating better encryption with no keys or back doors (Yar 2006: 151). 
As a result, “the access acquired by law enforcement will prove ineffective in countering 
encryption used by professional criminals - its only use will be to enable surveillance o f 
legitimate organizations and individuals” (Yar 2006: 151).
Since debates about the use of encryption technology continued for a period o f a 
decade, the thoughts or attitudes of law enforcement and the state may have instilled 
cultural beliefs into the larger public about resistance to surveillance altogether. The 
sentences for encryption use that were proposed demonstrates the harsh punishments and 
labels put onto encryption users as, for example, a proposal launched in the UK had the 
trajectory in its “Electronics Communications Bill (1998) to allow law enforcement to 
demand keys from encryption users, with a failure to comply carrying a ‘presumption of 
guilt’ and resulting in a two-year custodial sentence” (Yar 2006: 150). Also, France, in “the 
mid-1990s, saw attempts to institute a public ban on so-called ‘strong encryption’, with the
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state arguing that only those with something illegal to hide need have access to sueh 
security tools” (Yar, 2006: 149). In these cases, it can be understood that governments have 
attempted to exercise power to repress privacy and secrecy by labeling those who defy 
them as criminal. With such serious consequenees and labels associated with a surveillance 
blocking tool some may have gotten mixed feelings about surveillanee.
Marx, in his article “A Tack in the Shoe: Neutralizing and Resisting the New 
Surveillance”, speaks about the cultural beliefs that support surveillance (2003). Included 
are ideas such as ‘“ It’s for my own good’ [and] T m  getting paid’”; he argues that “a laek 
of resistance to intrusive surveillance may mask as acceptanee because o f a fear o f being 
sanetioned or losing one’s job, position, or privilege” which relate to the consequences o f 
being caught using encryption technology or other surveillanee blocking tools (Marx 2003 : 
370). Marx also states that there may be a “lack o f awareness of the extent and nature of 
surveillance, or o f the potential for abuse and misuse o f personal information [which] may 
also support acquiescence” (2003: 371). At the same time, the discourse on encryption and 
other methods of avoiding surveillance demonstrates how governments were trying to gain 
control over people’s beliefs about surveillance. Power was exercised in an attempt to 
repress secrets and hiding information. This was met by the endeavours of privacy activists 
to protect citizens from privacy violations. Although these efforts failed, it does not mean 
that resistance against surveillance has stopped. Rather, it has taken on a new form of small 
group or individual resistance. A question of trust that can be posed from this discussion is 
whether society views those who try to hide information as untrustworthy?
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Small Group Resistance
The failures or limitations o f large organizations to resist surveillance demonstrate 
that resistance may be more productive when it is performed by smaller groups of people or 
individuals. Indeed, small seale attempts are practiced on an everyday basis by ordinary 
people who achieve “short term gains that are important to daily life” (Gilliom 2006: 113). 
These movements may be more successful and easier to conduct because of the way 
surveillance is set up. As Genosko makes clear in his chapter “(Im)Possible Exchanges”, 
the possibility o f why smaller resistance movements may be more frequent and productive 
is because when “certain technologies are defined along Giddens’s lines through the 
concept o f distanciated observation, response becomes extremely difficult and, perhaps 
most importantly, counter-surveillance is limited to a small group or individual affair 
rather than a widespread practice” (1996: 33). Gilliom makes a related point, in that with 
no “grand and visible displays o f power over groups o f people, it should hardly surprise us 
that forms of opposition and resistance are equally discreet and discrete” (2006: 121). 
Surveillance technologies or control systems “are not usually as effective and efficient as 
their advocates claim and they often have a variety o f unintended consequences” (Marx 
2003: 371). Some of these consequences can provide a breaking point through which 
people begin to feel the need to resist. But more importantly, the unperfected surveillance 
gives an open space in forms o f “inherent contradictions, ambiguities, gaps, blind spots and 
limitations” through which “surveillance targets have a space to maneuver and use 
counter-technologies” (Marx 2003: 372).
As Marx claims, individuals are “often something more than a passive and
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compliant reed buffeted about by the imposing winds of the more powerful, or dependent 
only on protest organizations for ideas about resistance. Humans are wonderfully inventive 
at finding ways to beat control systems and avoid observation” (2003: 372). With that said, 
Marx discusses eleven generic techniques o f surveillanee neutralization that are used by 
the strong, as well as by the weak (2003: 372). These techniques can indirectly neutralize 
surveillanee - such as discovery moves in which a person attempts to find if surveillance is 
in operation and to locate it, avoidance moves in which a person avoids the surveillance 
upon discovery, and blocking moves in which a person covers certain items that can be 
identified. These techniques can also be drastic movements that directly neutralize 
surveillance - sueh as using breaking moves in which a person tampers with or destroys a 
surveillance mechanism, refusal moves in which a person outrightly refuses to be 
surveilled, or masking moves in which a person replaces blocked information with 
misleading information (Marx 2003). Each can be performed by amateurs or experts, 
legitimate persons or illegitimate persons. But an important point is that the cultural beliefs 
for why surveillance is resisted are based on issues o f distrust, such as not trusting the 
company to keep information confidential, thinking that the collection process is sneaky, 
and believing that surveillanee is distrusting the legitimate person (Marx 2003: 373). These 
reasons for resistance differ based on the context o f the situation, which also demonstrates 
that the level of trust differs based on the context as well. Levels o f resistance also differ 
with levels o f power as those who are under more control may find it harder to resist and 
may resist for different reasons than those who are under less. This will become clearer in 
the discussion of Gilliom’s work on welfare users.
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Resistance occurs mostly “when individuals feel that the surveillance is wrong, or 
feel that they are unfairly disadvantaged by it” (Marx 2003: 372). It may also occur as a 
challenge performed out of pleasure or “for reasons of self interest” (Marx 2003: 372). 
Marx notes that “people will break rules if  they regard an organization or its surveillance 
procedures as unacceptable or illegitimate, untrustworthy, or invalid, demeaning, 
unnecessary, or irrelevant” (2003: 373). These reasons for resisting are important because 
they show that privacy, which is used as the “vast bulk of responses to surveillance”, is not 
the defining factor for resistance (Lyon 2001: 128). Resisting surveillance is mostly made 
up of “spontaneous mobilizations that pose a range of challenges from the non-serious to 
serious” (Genosko 1996: 33). They include personal, private beliefs that cannot always be 
fought for by legal means or under the right of privacy. This means that each personal 
situation of suiv^eillance differs by intensity, consistency, and context. Thus, the subjects of 
surveillance and the reasons why they are surveilled must be looked at to fully understand 
the reasons for resistance and whether it can be viewed as legitimate or illegitimate.
In “Struggling with Surveillance: Resistance, Consciousness and Identity”, Gilliom 
focuses on the subjects o f surveillance, and their perspectives and understandings o f being 
watched. He explains that young mothers and their families are the primary users o f a 
welfare system in Ohio (Gilliom 2006: 115). They are thus monitored by a computer 
system known as the Client Registry Information System - Enhanced (CRIS-E) which 
“manages all case information about welfare clients in the state, storing and handling data 
pertaining to identity, paternity, health concerns, employment and edueational history, 
financial need, and any other of the myriad points of information collected by the welfare
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system” (Gilliom 2006: 115). Since this system is eombined with the “widely distributed 
posters and ads about the evils and dangers o f welfare fraud”, the eonstant questioning 
from caseworkers, as well as the constant threat o f potential blackmail from neighbours, 
former spouses and virtually anyone who “can choose to report them, invoke dormant rules 
or instigate investigation”, the impact and experience of surveillance of these women make 
them “valuable experts on the nature and politics o f surveillance” (Gilliom 2006: 115-116). 
Under all this pressure, these women are compelled to resist the confusing and restrictive 
rules of the welfare system to secure extra money to make up for the inadequate amount 
given to support families. From several interviews with these women, Gilliom discovered 
that adding to the stress that could be caused by errors from caseworkers, most women 
expressed fear that they would be caught; “It’s scary and if you are not worried about not 
being able to feed your children or have a home to sleep in you are worried about whether 
you are going to go to prison for welfare fraud” (2006: 117). Also discovered through 
Gilliom’s analysis is that the women did not make mention of the right to privacy (Gilliom 
2006: 118). Rather, the explanations for resistance made by them were with reference to 
needs and to provide for their families what the state did not; “a pattern of resistance that 
has clear results: desperately needed material benefits; the maintenance o f a zone of 
autonomy in the face of dependency of life on welfare; the sustenance of a shared identity 
o f mothering; and the undermining o f the surveillance mission itse lf’ (Gilliom 2006: 118). 
This demonstrates that the “frontline battle against [this] system of surveillance appears to 
be rooted in the everyday struggle to get by” unlike other cases where resistance may be 
simply carried out to maintain privacy (Gilliom 2006: 119). This analysis speaks to the
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importance of context when attempting to understand trust, as with the addition of 
surveillance demonstrates a decrease in the amount of trust. Does this portrayal o f welfare 
users show that they are untrustworthy by the institution? Also, does their situation show 
that they are deserving o f this amount of suspieion (Gilliom 2006; 124)?
Resistance and Trust
Conceptualizing trust in this eontext is important because it ean be seen as a driving 
force for resistance. As Gilliom makes clear “it is the ease that surveillance programs are 
different for those who are wanting or needing to deviate from the norms and those who are 
not” (Gilliom 2006: 125). If this is the ease then trust also differs depending on the context 
of the surveillance situation. Where power is a factor that can enforce surveillance, levels 
o f trust or distrust may also vary according to the levels of power. As seen in the case o f 
encryption those who resist may be viewed by the state, or even society, as untrustworthy 
or criminal; however those who resist may do so because they view the state, institution or 
organization as untrustworthy. If resistance is undertaken on a daily basis by most people, 
questions can be raised about whether members of society view the state or each other as 
untrustworthy. Are resistors really seen as untrustworthy? In addition, those who are under 
extreme situations of surveillance, such as the women and their families on welfare, must 
resist to support their families. The overwhelming surveillance they face may demonstrate 
an absence o f trust and may change how they are viewed by society. Are those that are 
more closely watched seen as less trustworthy? Is this only viewed by those who are 
watching them or society as a whole as well? The definition of trust that will help to answer
some of these questions will be derived from philosophy.
Philosophy and Trust
Some philosophers, such as Glaucon, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and Kant, have 
attempted to explain their perspectives on trust and justify when it is appropriate to 
consider. However, trust in philosophy is an elusive coneept as philosophers “often simply 
ignore it or presuppose it, and when they do consider it, they often struggle to explain it or 
confuse it with other things” (Bailey 2002: 1). To develop an understanding of 
philosophical trust the perspectives of these philosophers will be explained as well as more 
modem philosophical literature from authors Grovier and O ’Neill who include a social 
insight to help explain trust. The definition will be taken from Grovier in which trust “is in 
essence an attitude of positive expectation about other people, a sense that they are 
basically well intentioned and unlikely to harm us. To trust people is to expect that they 
will act well, that they will take our interests into account and not harm us” (1998: 6). 
Taken together, these theories can help explain how surveillance may seem to work as a 
replacement for trust when there is distrust and how it works to cause distmst or resistance. 
The philosophical understanding of trust largely takes the context into consideration, 
which makes it significant when relating to resistance.
The conceptualization o f trust by early philosophers was developed on the basis of 
how they perceived the state during the times of their writing. Glaucon, Plato’s older 
brother, Machiavelli and Hobbes all saw worlds in which people were self-interested. 
From a story he once heard about a man who when gone undetected embarked on
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mischievous behaviour, Glaucon argued “that only the fear of detection and punishment 
prevents a human being from breaking the law and doing evil for the sake o f his own 
self-interest” (Bailey 2002; 1). To know when it is right to trust someone he suggested that 
“we should trust others only if we are confident that they fear detection and punishment 
sufficiently to dissuade them from harming or stealing from us” (Bailey 2002; 1). The 
surveillance society, then, should be able to stop all from committing criminal acts; 
however this is not the case. Rather, people will continue to steal and vandalize in front of 
surveillance cameras. Following Glaucan, Machiavelli states that in case the fear of 
punishment and detection are not enough, and also so as not to be vulnerable to others, one 
must “be prepared to be cruel, murderous, dishonourable, deceptive, and miserly whenever 
necessary to maintain their power” (Bailey 2002: 1). This means that those who must trust 
are in a vulnerable state and must be prepared to strike in the chance that those who are 
trusted choose to attack. Thus the “distrust and attacks will spiral, ending only with the 
victory of the most brutal and cunning” (Bailey 2002: 1). In an attempt to prevent an 
imminent war from this problem of trust, Hobbes believed in the idea of a mutual truce or 
agreement as a solution. He, unlike the others, recognized “that we might wish to agree to a 
truce amongst ourselves, an agreement to restrain the pursuit o f self-interest when 
necessary to avoid war” (Bailey 2002: 2). The problem with the idea of the truce, he 
suggests, is that it may be irrational as not everyone may follow it after it is made. Partly, 
this is due to the advantages that could be taken up by an individual or group in breaking 
the agreement, and also because one may “reason badly, fail to consider the future, or are 
carried away by other feelings” such as obsessions or anxieties (Bailey 2002: 2). Thus a
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truce would likely not work because of “the prevalence of irrationality among human 
beings, the uncertainty of knowing who might act irrationally, and when, and the huge risks 
involved in keeping to the agreement” (Bailey 2002: 2). Ultimately, “Hobbes concludes 
that even those rational enough to wish that the agreement be kept would be foolish to keep 
it" (Bailey 2002: 2).
These theories show great distrust in society; a place where only fear and threats 
may be the only possible ways to create any sort of trust in others. If society did work in 
this way we would all be completely exhausted from trying to resist all potential attackers 
every day. Fortunately, Hume was a philosopher who reasoned that not everyone at every 
time was self-interested to this extent. He recognized “that human beings namrally care for 
their loved ones and sympathise with others’ feelings, including those o f complete 
strangers” (Bailey 2002: 3). Though he admits sympathy and love may be not enough 
reason to trust because there is always the chance that bonds between brothers can be 
ruined from self-interest, Hume does state that a way around this may be through putting 
faith in other areas “such as education and civilization to improve and spread out sympathy 
for others, and thus reduce the likelihood of distrust and war” (Bailey 2002: 3). A shared 
sense of morality may help get rid o f selfish desires as Locke and Kant argued that morality 
“might be eultivated to overcome the partiality o f self-interest” (Bailey 2002:3). At the end 
o f his discussion, Bailey suggests that what is not included in these arguments is a sense of 
genuine trust (Bailey 2002: 4). He recognizes that in order for someone to even achieve 
immoral or unjust ends; there must be the “possibility o f relying on each other to behave 
and respond in predictable, manageable ways [which] is particularly valuable for human
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beings” (Bailey 2002: 4). In this case, people must be “taking responsibility for how their 
behaviour will influence [others’] deeisions about how to act in a particular regard” (Bailey 
2002: 4). Importantly, he argues that “one cannot genuinely trust others if  one resorts only 
to relianee on detection, punishment, love, sympathy, or a sense of morality, [but that] one 
can certainly make some use of sueh resorts without necessarily failing to trust” (Bailey 
2002:4).
Society may not be as full o f selfish individuals as some philosophers have insisted, 
but in the end they do bring up important points about distrust and recourse used to help in 
situations defined by lack of trust. It is not possible to completely trust or distrust because 
they are both “suseeptible to degrees: [where] we may trust or distrust someone slightly, 
moderately, or completely” and also because “[b]oth attitudes are often relative to 
contexts: [where] we might, without hesitation, trust a person to deliver a pareel and yet 
feel ambivalent about trusting him to repair a computer” (Grovier 1998: 121). This means 
that distrust can be expected in some situations, but the more that “trust is deep and 
complete makes a harmful act more shocking” (Grovier 1998: 142). Relying on detection, 
punishment or other means to be able to trust others may be a way that society combats 
feelings o f distrust. In this case, the use of surveillance would suggest that society distrusts 
government and vice-versa because surveillance is found in both realms. The surveillance 
in government institutions could create the potential for society to trust the government 
because society can see that the government is doing its job properly. It may be used to 
thwart feelings of distrust. However, these techniques may also be seen as attempts to 
exercise power and cause resistance even by government workers. The next section will
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discuss some further techniques to combat feelings o f untrustworthiness.
Combating Distrust
To solve a problem of distrust there are a few methods that can be used. A person 
may “try to manage some aspects o f the relationship by appealing to rules” (Grovier 1998: 
155). However, where “we are inclined to appeal to rules” due to a lack of trust, “the less 
useful those rules are likely to be” (Grovier 1998: 155). This is because the “negotiating, 
agreeing on and complying with rules presupposes trust” (Grovier 1998: 155). Situations 
may be encountered that the rules do not cover and “where there is trust we assume that 
they [those trusted] will be flexible and reasonable in working to solve unanticipated 
problems” (Grovier 1998; 158). As such, “[f]or rules to work, we need confidence in 
other’s good judgment and goodwill”, in distrusting “we feel the need for some guarantee 
that the other will do what is required when a problem arises. And no such guarantee can 
be contained in the rules themselves” (Grovier 1998: 158). In this case, appealing to rules 
cannot be used to reduce distrust and leaves the issue o f distrust unresolved. Using 
contracts is another method that can potentially lower feelings of distrust. Grovier notes 
that “[t]hough helpful on occasion, they do not eliminate the need for trust”; contracts are 
“at best a partial strategy for managing distrust” (1998: 158). They can even hinder trust as 
the “very suggestion that arrangements should be formalized in writing can destroy trust” 
(Grovier 2007: 53). Again, the issue o f trust is not resolved leaving either party potentially 
unsatisfied. There is also the idea o f using the law to solve problems of distrust. However, 
issues of trust are left unsettled as “laws do not by themselves change attitudes” (Grovier
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1998:162). Law’s use “may be a factor in monitoring restraint and safety, and it may 
prevent people from physically terrorizing each other [but] legal proceedings and 
injunctions in themselves do little to nothing to address problems of distrust” (Grovier 
1998:163).
Grovier explains the idea of controlling and the exercise o f power as another way to 
reduce distrust that fails. Controlling others may be a response to distrust which can be an 
especially “tempting response for parents or others who are in a position to exercise 
power” (Grovier 1998: 158-159). In attempting to exercise power, especially in situations 
o f unequal power distributions “[ejfforts to control imply a lack of trust or confidence” that 
“breeds [feelings of] untrustworthiness and more distrust, and eventually control leads to 
resentment and rebellion” (Grovier 1998: 159). This is especially the ease when those upon 
whom power is exercised have “any aspiration for autonomy” (Grovier 1998: 159). There 
is no opportunity for those controlled to truly be themselves or show that they are 
trustworthy, and it is likely that those, such as children, who “have been too strictly 
controlled [...] strike out in rebellion the moment they can gain their freedom” (Grovier 
1998: 159). Where power is at an equal level between individuals or groups, “control is 
even less promising as a response to situations of distrust” because the “potential for 
exercising control is quite limited” (Grovier 1998: 159). The attempts at controlling in 
these cases can be ineffective and counter-productive as it may only inspire resistance 
(Grovier 1998: 160). Surveillance, Grovier explains, is “an attempt to extend control (or 
the potential for it) to occasions when one is not present” (1998:159). Using surveillance 
can actually solve distrust, but only very rarely and in situations where it can be used to
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prove that someone is trustworthy (Grovier 1998; 159). Using excessive amounts 
surveillance can entail “serious invasions of privacy and high costs to the relationship 
involved if and when it is discovered” (Grovier 2007: 53). Controlling or exercising power 
over others in all cases “undermines the autonomy of others” and alienates them from the 
controllers (Grovier 1998: 161). It is ultimately seen as an “expression of distrust” (Grovier 
1998: 161). Therefore, all who attempt to exercise power have the potential to be seen as 
distrustful, and this becomes even worse for those who have equal levels of power as their 
attempt to control can appear as “manipulative and domineering” (Grovier 1998: 160). As 
a result, where there are opportunities people will resist.
In each case, one person or group may be understood as attempting to exercise 
power over another by using rules, contracts, the law, control or surveillance. Whereas 
trusting can make some feel empowered and worthy, these methods fail because they 
demonstrate an absence of trust and hurt the development of autonomy of the other person 
or group. As a result those controlled may understand that they are perceived as 
untrustworthy and resist or rebel. Part o f the danger in causing distrust is that regaining 
trust may not be so easily done as “even evidence of positive behaviour and intentions [...] 
is likely to be seen with suspicion, to be interpreted as misleading and, when properly 
understood, as negative after all” (Grovier 2007: 52). Also, the costs of distrust may 
include a lack of openness, strong pressures “to pretend an acceptance of others even when 
we do not feel it” and a sense o f unease about those we distrust (Grovier 2007: 53). Though 
“when we distrust someone when we doubt that he is what he purports to be, social 
convention almost requires that we disguise our own attitude, hide our doubts and pretend
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all is well”, forms o f surveillance that cause feelings o f obvious distrust ean have more 
serious reactions (Grovier 1998: 145). “In making explicit the sense that the affected 
people are regarded as potentially untrustworthy, these policies tend to evoke feelings o f 
alienation, hurt, and/or disloyalty resulting in unwillingness to go the extra mile, working 
to rule, lack of commitment to the organization, people, and tasks involved, or even 
cheating and dishonesty” (Grovier 2007: 53). Resistance will follow because o f the distrust 
and the undermining of autonomy created by surveillance and control.
Welfare Users and Distrust
In the case o f welfare users, there is an extreme power differential between them 
and the government. They may not display or express signs o f distmst, but their position 
and situation make them easy targets for surveillance. In exercising power through 
surveillance and the CRIS-E system, the attempt at control demonstrates signs of distmst. 
The context o f their situation, where they live in “something closer to the original idea of 
the Panopticon than others who must face not so much a singular and powerful 
omnipresence, but rather numerous checkpoints”, makes it evident that there is almost a 
complete absence of tmst (Gilliom 2006: 124). This harms welfare users as they complain 
“about degradation and humiliation” and it undermines their autonomy as capable mothers 
who provide for their families (Gilliom 2006: 123). Their ability to resist and make extra 
money shows an open gap in the routine of surveillance. However, the control that they are 
under does not allow them very much room for resistance. Their resistance does not
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demonstrate a problem of distrust, but rather a problem of survival and getting by; they 
must resist to survive. They understand the distrust that they must fight by providing proof 
that they are not receiving any extra income. The method of surveillance is not providing 
any kind of trust and can act to damage it by causing fear and unease in those being 
watched. The extreme amount o f control creates a different force for resistance than 
distrust, but shows how surveillance has severe implications to those being watched.
How Distrust Begets Resistance and More Distrust
O ’Neill discusses the problem of distrust that is faced by the government from 
society in the UK. Her analysis demonstrates just how well surveillance works at 
hampering and dampening trust. A problem of distrust has been raised because “a look at 
past news reports show[s] that there has always been some failure and some abuse of trust” 
(O ’Neill 2002; 44). The supposed remedy to this suspicion “lies in preventions and 
sanctions” or fear o f punishment where “[gjovemment, institutions and professionals 
should be made more accountable” (O’Neill 2002: 45). For those working in the public 
sector, this call for more accountability “takes the form of detailed control” through strict 
legislation and regulation (O’Neill 2002: 46). What is required is “detailed conformity to 
procedures and protocols, detailed record keeping and provision o f information in 
specified formats and success in reaching targets” (O’Neill 2002: 46). These solutions to 
distrust resemble rules, contracts and surveillance discussed by Grovier. The standards that 
are produced to ensure that public needs are being met can resemble a type of power that is
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exercised by society. It is a demand for more transparency which represses and destroys 
secrecy and any plot that the government may have to exploit taxpayers, “but it may not 
limit the deception and the deliberate information that undermine relations of trust” 
(O’Neill 2002: 70). This is because “[tjransparency can encourage people to be less honest, 
so increasing deception and reducing reasons for trust: those who know that everything 
they say or write is to be made public may massage the truth [...] Demands for universal 
transparency are likely to encourage the evasions, hypocrisies and half-truths that we 
usually refer to as ‘political correctness’, but whieh might more forthrightly be called 
either ‘self-censorship’ or ‘deception’” (O ’Neill 2002: 73). An increase in transparency 
can damage trust because it creates a “flood of unsorted information and misinformation” 
that adds to “uncertainty rather than to trust” (O’Neill 72-73). O ’Neill demonstrates that 
even those in government can use resistance techniques to hide the full truth. This leads 
society to further distrust the government beeause they cannot sort the information into 
truth, lies or half-truths. Also, the technology takes away from any sort of active inquiry, 
which is done “over time by talking, asking questions, [and] by listening”, that can be used 
to help build trust (O’Neill 2002: 76). Both government institutions and society are at a loss 
in this situation as more distrust is created from various forms of resistance and 
surveillance. Surveillance does not seem to help the situation, and instead can be conceived 
as fuel for the fire.
Resistance, Philosophy and Trust
Surveillance can be understood as a form of control that makes some people feel
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threatened and others untrustworthy. Surveillance ean be used to try and combat distrust, 
but it is almost always unsuccessful. In very rare cases it can be used to prove 
trustworthiness, but this is in the form of a revindication. It actually helps to put resistance 
in motion beeause of these feelings of distrust it ereates. However, as seen in O ’Neill’s 
analysis, surveillance and distrust begets resistance and more distrust, which creates a push 
for more control and more surveillance. Tight and unreasonable controls such as in the ease 
of welfare users, ean stop resistance that is performed for reasons o f distrust and create 
resistance for purposes o f survival. In any case, surveillance does not provide much or any 
room for trust, but can damage it and feed the fire for resistance.
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Conclusion
Surveillance is present in all aspects of daily life. It perfuses all environments - 
offline, online, work, home and play - and is necessary to establish the identity of strangers. 
Trust is necessary as well for people to enter into various social situations feeling secure 
and confident (Grovier 1998: 86). Both aspects are important for a thriving society; 
however, where surveillance can hold society together, it can also be what hinders the 
development o f relationships and erodes the levels of trust in society.
Each key theme in the surveillance literature was reviewed with certain aspects 
discussed in detail. Questions of trust were posed on the basis o f each discussion. Trust was 
defined or conceptualized according to the corresponding discipline that cohered with the 
surveillance theme and contributed to the analysis. The definition was used to try and 
explain whether the situation of surveillance was working to negotiate, manipulate, 
replace, build or damage trust. The definitions could not provide full explanations of all of 
the aspects o f surveillance in each theory, but were helpful in explaining why surveillance 
modified trust. The research has provided a discourse analysis where disparate literatures - 
those on surveillance and trust - were discussed and productively tied together.
Examining surveillance and trust has made it clearer that trust is very rarely built or 
fostered through any type of surveillance technology or technique. Each theme examined 
in the four areas of social surveillance theories provided evidence of the dangers and 
damages surveillance has on various aspects of everyday life. When questions o f trust were 
posed and analyzed through definitions of trust borrowed from different disciplines some 
of the reasons why surveillance does not or cannot foster trust were discovered.
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In summary, my findings may be presented in two categories that add to the re 
existing schema presented in the introduction.
Linkages and Contexts Issues and Outcomes
1. Automated personal information 
gathering online and abstractions 
o f data mining; Illusion of consent
Manipulation of trust by sellers in a climate 
of generalized distrust of e-commerce; 
Dehumanizing consumers by technical 
distancing; Coerced trust and manufactured 
consent
2. Disciplinary media spectacle as a 
silencing device; Panoptic/ 
synoptic parallels
Trust as a diminished social and public 
benefit; False idols o f interpersonal intimacy 
(for example, television personalities); 
Online communities without obligations and 
tools to build collective values
3. Technologization of security 
substitutes for policy development; 
Surveillance as security constructs 
insecurity, anxiety, fear, suspicion 
and racial hatred
Profiling precludes trust; Security as a 
consumer good is self cancelling, 
de-socializing and isolating; Only large scale 
social change could restore trust; Restoration 
of trust through transparency and public 
admissions are insufficient; (in)Security 
conditions citizens to accept new security 
technologies
4. Trust is context sensitive; 
Microresistance exists at every 
point o f microphysics of power; 
Limits of legal recourse; Curtailed 
encryption
Resistance exploits cracks in imperfect 
surveillance; Distrust is the engine driving 
creative resistance; Spiral o f distrust is 
interrupted by survival; Very rarely 
surveillance “proves” trust as revindication
The main purpose of the Panopticon is to discipline bodies through a method of 
surveillance that ensured an automatic functioning of power. Today, the electronic 
Panopticon collects information, analyzes it and makes predictions. It ultimately collects 
more knowledge that is used to gain power. Trust was apparent in the relationships formed
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after information was divulged through the illusion of voluntariness. In order to continue 
the flow of information that is significant to most companies, relations would need to be 
maintained with customers, which suggested a development of trust. The business 
discipline provided some online techniques that could be used to gain and maintain trust 
between consumers and businesses. Ultimately, it was understood that in most cases 
businesses were more interested in collecting information and managing customers than in 
actually maintaining trust out of concern for the consumer. This demonstrated a 
manipulation of trust.
In analyzing the synopticon, it was found that the many watching the few did not 
act to create any forms of trust between individuals. It was hypothesized that trust could be 
developed from the interactions that could start up from interests in familiar television 
shows or developed in online communities made up o f various forums where people could 
post personal information to strangers. Sociology analyzed trust as a function through 
which many benefits could be gained, so the analysis o f trust focused on whether the 
elements of the synopticon could build trust that support its various functions. Using the 
technology to try and build trust was found to be unsuccessful. Watching television 
actually acted to decrease time spent in activities that could support functions of trust. The 
familiarity of television programs acted as grounds for communication, but these 
interactions were found to function weakly and hamper the potential for sustaining and 
creating meaningful relationships. Also, television could reinforce that certain members of 
society or certain areas o f society are not to be trusted. Online communities were found to 
fail at developing trust because they only develop an artificial sense of community. The
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disconnected and disembodied interactions between individuals are not backed by trust. 
Online communities also failed to support functions o f trust because they could not build 
values as traditional communities could. This is because they are linked to bureaucracy and 
law, which take over in cases where values are lacking. Overall, elements found in the 
synopticon could not produce the basis to facilitate functions of trust.
Security, in itself, creates feelings of distrust and insecurity. Though security 
technology can be found in almost every building, 9/11 acted to enhance and massify 
security surveillance and techniques. Defense and protection from risks since 9/11 has 
been made into more of an individual problem and certain groups have been screened and 
targeted more by security. Social psychology provided an understanding of the importance 
of experience, and the effects of threat and powerlessness that influence decisions to trust. 
Consistent reports of terrorism on television create an environment o f perpetual fear, with 
terror occurring in seemingly normal situations. It can justify surveillance technology 
which, in turn, also reminds society that danger lurks around every comer. Surveillance 
technologies may be consumed to gain a sense o f power, albeit a false one, that can protect 
against the everyday threat of terrorism. Those profiled groups who are targeted by 
surveillance face the distrust o f government in the guise of the police officers that 
constantly stop them for unjustified reasons. It undermines them as citizens who deserve 
equal rights. Taken together, this security undermines the development of trust and even 
the social interactions that can be used to build trust and an actual sense of security.
Foucault’s microphysics of power entails microresistances. Several reasons have 
been suggested as to why some people resist surveillance or acquiesce to its procedures.
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Surveillance suggests an absence o f trust, and whether this is backed by actual feelings of 
distrust or not, it will be resisted. Philosophy has worked well to explain the consequences 
of using surveillance as a technique to combat feelings of distrust. It can create feelings of 
distrust or undermine autonomy which mobilizes acts against it. Resistance to surveillance 
is acted out both by members of society who are watched by the government and acted out 
by government employees who are monitored by society. Resistance makes it even more 
difficult to trust, which suggests the almost complete failure of surveillance to produce or 
support any form of trust. At best and rarely, surveillance can prove trust exists after the 
fact of distrust. Importantly, philosophy taught that exiting the spiral of distrust for the sake 
o f survival is a tactic that does not restore trust, but trumps distrust. It is evidence of state 
violence by means o f surveillance.
The intention of this thesis was to understand whether surveillance is acting to 
negotiate, manipulate, replace, build or damage trust. This research shows that surveillance 
works to damage or manipulate any type of trust in society. It cannot work to build, foster 
or maintain trust. Surveillance is manipulating trust in some cases, acting to damage it and 
preventing its onset in others. Overall, the use of surveillance does not convey trust or 
supply space for trust to build. Trust is not developed through watching television or 
divulging personal information. It is not fostered by security surveillance that is supposed 
to make people feel safe. It is not a large deal to businesses who manipulate trust to gather 
more information from online users. And finally trust is not created by surveillance as 
surveillance seems to motivate distrust that mobilizes resistance and reduces chances of 
creating autonomy.
104
This research has also made clear how truly important trust is and why it is the glue 
of society (Grovier 1998: 6). Destroying or damaging trust can have results that are quite 
severe and detrimental. This makes it vital to continue research on trust. Surveillance does 
not seem to be a source for any type of trust; however it does not completely damage or 
destroy trust as we still continue to put trust in systems, people and objects. Further 
research could be done to try and discover how trust is maintained in small acts and how it 
is built against most odds. Finding sources o f trust and supporting them could help increase 
trust or at least prevent it from further decreases.
Our world may not be as dystopian as Orwell imagined, but surveillance does seem 
to work in some of the ways that he describes. It seems to blur the boundaries between the 
watched and the watchers. It certainly can act to make some people fear their own actions 
in front of cameras and other people, while at the same time it can make us cautious of 
seemingly normal behaviours o f others. It changes the levels o f trust in society, but this 
depends on various aspects, such as context, past experiences, and beliefs. In the end, 
surveillance does not completely destroy trust. Trust still exists in society, but it is not 
supplied or created by surveillance.
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